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HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT ACTIONS, TITLE VII, AND
THE ADA: THE LIMITS OF THE COPY-AND-PASTE
FUNCTION
By Lisa Eichhom*
Abstract-: Two federal circuits, borrowing from Title VII jurisprudence, recently
recognized a cause of action for a disability-based hostile environment under the Americans
with Disabilities Act (ADA). Neither opinion, however, considered how the analysis of a
disability-based hostile environment claim under the ADA might differ from that of a race- or
sex-based hostile environment claim under Title VII. This Article examines the differing
theories of equality underlying the two statutes and argues that, because the statutes prohibit
discrimination in fundamentally different ways, courts must resist the temptation to copy and
paste Title VII doctrine into ADA hostile environment opinions. This Article instead suggests
an analysis of ADA hostile environment actions that is consistent with the specific
combination of theories underlying that statute.
In the spring of 2001, for the first time, two federal circuit courts
recognized claims for disability-based workplace harassment under the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).' While several district courts
had previously recognized such claims,2 and a few circuit courts had
assumed in dicta that such claims could exist,3 the Fifth Circuit, in
* Associate Professor, University of South Carolina School of Law. J.D., 1990, Duke Law School;
A.B., 1987, Princeton University. The author wishes to thank the entire staff of the Coleman-Karesh
Library at the University of South Carolina School of Law for invaluable assistance in the
preparation of this article.
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994). Title I of the ADA, §§ 12111-12117, prohibits disability
discrimination in employment. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). The U.S. Supreme Court has recently
restricted the enforcement of this provision by holding that the Eleventh Amendment bars individual
plaintiffs from suing state employers for damages under Title I. See Bd. of Tr. of the Univ. of Ala. v.
Garrett, 121 S. Ct. 955, 960 (2001). This holding, however, does not affect Title I suits against other
types of employers. See id. at 962 (describing scope of Eleventh Amendment).
2. See, e.g., Hudson v. Loretex Corp., No. 95-CV-844, 1997 WL 159282, at *3-*4 (N.D.N.Y.
Apr. 2, 1997); Haysman v. Food lion, Inc., 893 F. Supp. 1092, 1106 (S.D. Ga. 1995). See generally
Frank S. Ravitch, Beyond Reasonable Accommodation: The Availability and Structure of a Cause of
Action for Workplace Harassment Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 15 CARDozo L REV.
1475 (1994) (arguing that hostile environment action exists under ADA).
3. See, e.g., Conley v. Vill. of Bedford Park, 215 F.3d 703, 712-13 (7th Cir. 2000); Walton v.
Mental Health Ass'n of S.E. Pa., 168 F.3d 661, 666-67 (3d Cir. 1999); Cannice v. Norwest Bank
Iowa N.A., 189 F.3d 723, 725 (Sth Cir. 1999). See also Keever v. City of Middletown, 145 F.3d 809,
813 (6th Cir. 1998) (assuming implicitly that disability-based harassment is actionable but affirming
summary judgment against plaintiff on ground that he had failed to establish that "the harassment he
claims took place was severe enough to create an objectively hostile work environment").
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Flowers v. Southern Regional Physician Services,4 and the Fourth
Circuit, in Fox v. General Motors Corp.,' each explicitly confirmed the
availability of this cause of action and affirmed judgments for plaintiffs
who had prevailed at trial under ADA hostile environment harassment
theories.6
In Flowers, trial evidence had revealed that plaintiff Sandra Flowers's
supervisor at Southern Regional had begun intercepting Flowers's
telephone calls, eavesdropping on her conversations, and hovering
around Flowers's desk soon after learning that Flowers was I{V-
positive.7 In addition, the supervisor stopped socializing and having
lunch with Flowers, although the two had been close friends up until that
time.8 Similarly, Southern Regional's president suddenly refused to
shake Flowers's hand and began using circuitous routes in the building to
avoid passing by her office.9 Further, after revealing her HIV-status,
Flowers was required to undergo four random drug tests within a one-
week period, whereas in her prior eighteen months at Southern Regional,
she had been required to undergo only one." The Fourth Circuit,
reviewing the evidence presented at trial in its entirety, held that the jury
could properly have found actionable harassment on the part of Southern
Regional under the ADA."
In Fox, the evidence produced at trial revealed that plaintiff Robert
Fox had suffered even more severe harassment than Flowers. In 1994,
Fox had returned to his job at GM following a disability leave.' 2 Fox had
suffered numerous back injuries, and his doctor had restricted him to
light-duty work. 13 Nevertheless, two of his supervisors insisted that he
4. 247 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2001).
5. 247 F.3d 169 (4th Cir. 2001).
6. Fox, 247 F.3d at 172; Flowers, 247 F.3d at 235-38. Hostile environment and quid pro quo are
two commonly recognized forms of workplace harassment. See infra notes 56-65 and accompanying
text. Hostile environment harassment arises from objectively abusive workplace conditions. See
infra notes 94-102 and accompanying text. Quid pro quo harassment, which arises only in the
context of sex discrimination, involves requests for sexual favors in exchange for specific job-
related benefits such as promotions and raises. See infra notes 56-61 and accompanying text.
7. Flowers, 247 F.3d at 236.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 237.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Fox, 247 F.3d at 172.
13. Id. at 173.
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not work at the "light-duty table" but instead perform tasks that were
beyond his physical ability. 4 When Fox tried to explain the reason for
his medical restriction, a supervisor told him, "I don't need any of you
handicapped M-F-'s.''"s Later, instead of letting Fox work at the light-
duty table with other employees, another supervisor assigned Fox to a
small individual table and chair in a hazardous area. Because the table
was too low for Fox, he aggravated his back injury while working
there. 6 The same supervisor routinely referred to disabled employees as
"handicapped MFs" and "911 hospital people" and instructed other
employees not to talk to them. 7 He also refused to permit disabled
employees to work overtime. 8 Based on testimony regarding these and
other incidents, the Fifth Circuit held that it could not disturb the jury's
finding in Fox's favor because he had "presented evidence of objectively
severe and pervasive workplace harassment."19
In both Fox and Flowers, the circuit courts began their examinations
of whether hostile environment harassment could be actionable under the
ADA by noting that the statute explicitly prohibits discrimination related
to the "terms, conditions, and privileges" of employment." Both
opinions then observed that this statutory language echoes a prohibition
in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,21 which proscribes
workplace discrimination on the basis of race, sex, national origin, and
religion.2 Years before the ADA was drafted, the Supreme Court had
held that the "terms, conditions, or privileges" language in Title VII
14. Id.
15. Id. Several trial witnesses were reluctant to "repeat some of the language that their supervisors
had used, so instead they just said the first letter of, or spelled out, the word in question:' Id. at 173
n.2.
16. Id. at 173.
17. Id. at 174 (internal quotations omitted).
18. Id.
19. Id. at 179.
20. Id. at 175 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (1994)); Flowers v. S. Reg'1 Physician Servs., 247
F.3d 229, 233 (5th Cir. 2001) (same).
21. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) ("It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer...
to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment....").
22. 'Title VII provides that it is unlawful for an employer... 'to discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because
of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin[.]' Flowers, 247 F.3d at 233
(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)) (emphasis and brackets added in Flowers). See also Fox, 247
F.3d at 175 (quoting "terms, conditions, or privileges of employment" language from Title VII).
Washington Law Review
entitled employees to be free from workplace harassment based on the
characteristics protected by that statute.23 The Fox and Flowers courts
reasoned that Congress included the "terms, conditions, and privileges"
language in the ADA to afford similar protections to employees with
disabilities.24 Indeed, lower courts specifically addressing the issue had
arrived at the same conclusion through similar reasoning.'
Whether the ADA encompasses a workplace harassment theory was
thus a relatively easy question. The ramifications of the Fox and Flowers
holdings, however, are much more complex. While harassment actions
under Title VII and the ADA stem from identical statutory terms, the
theories of equality and notions of discrimination underlying the two
statutes are quite different.26 Title VII fosters workplace equality by
requiring employers to ignore certain characteristics of employees such
as race and sex, which do not normally affect job performance.2 7 The
ADA adopts this principle with respect to disability, requiring employers
to ignore employees' disabilities that have no impact on job-related
capabilities, but the statute goes further. Through its "reasonable
accommodation" requirement, the ADA creates an affirmative duty on
the part of employers to alter the conditions of employment, when
necessary and reasonable, to allow disabled employees an equal
23. Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65-66 (1986).
24. Fox, 247 F.3d at 175-76; Flowers, 247 F.3d at 233.
25. See, e.g., Haysman v. Food Lion, Inc., 893 F. Supp. 1092, 1106 (S.D. Ga. 1995). See also
Rodriguez v. Loctite P.R., Inc., 967 F. Supp. 653, 663 (D.P.R. 1997) (stating that "hostile work
environment claims should be actionable under the ADA, and that the analysis should borrow from
hostile work environment claims under Title VII," but ultimately holding that plaintiff's alleged
harassment was not sufficiently severe to support such a claim).
26. For analyses of the models of equality informing Title VII and the ADA, see generally Bonnie
Poitras Tucker, The ADA's Revolving Door: Inherent Flaws in the Civil Rights Paradigm, 62 OHio
ST. L.J. 335 (2001); Arlene B. Mayerson & Silvia Yee, The ADA and Models of Equality, 62 OHIO
ST. L.J. 535 (2001); S. Elizabeth Wilborn Malloy, Something Borrowed, Something Blue: Why
Disability Law Claims Are Different, 33 CONN. L. REV. 603 (2001); Matthew Diller, Judicial
Backlash, the ADA, and the Civil Rights Model, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 19 (2000). See also
Paul Steven Miller, Disability Civil Rights and a New Paradigm for the Twenty-First Century: The
Expansion of Civil Rights Beyond Race, Gender, and Age, 1 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 511, 515-21
(1998) (comparing Title VII and ADA discrimination paradigms); Robert L. Burgdorf, Jr., The
Americans with Disabilities Act: Analysis and Implications of a Second-Generation Civil Rights
Statute, 26 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 413, 492-522 (1991) (analyzing significant structural
differences between the ADA and prior civil rights legislation).
27. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1994). For a detailed discussion of Title VII doctrine, see
MARK ROTHSTEIN, ET AL., EMPLOYMENT LAW 131-302 (2d ed. 1999).
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opportunity to perform in the workplace. 2 Therefore, in some instances,
an employer must take account of employees' disabilities. Indeed, the
employer may sometimes even be obligated to work with disabled
employees individually to determine what types of workplace
accommodations are appropriate in specific cases. 9 Thus, where under
Title VII, equality requires similar treatment despite differences of race,
sex, national origin, and religion, under the ADA it sometimes requires
different treatment because of disability.
In addition, the ADA protects individuals not on the basis of universal
characteristics like race or sex, but rather on the basis of their
membership in a statutorily-limited class of individuals with
disabilities." Therefore, whether the ADA even applies to a given
situation depends upon the often complex threshold issue of whether the
plaintiff has an impairment that qualifies as a "disability" as that term is
expressly defined by the statute.31 A Title VII plaintiff, on the other hand,
does not normally need to prove membership in any particular class to
pursue a discrimination claim.32 To the extent that some jurisdictions
specifically list "membership in a protected class" as an element of a
Title VII harassment action,33 plaintiffs rarely if ever have difficulty
establishing their sex, race, national origin, or religion.34
To date, no court has addressed whether these significant differences
between the two statutes might have any bearing on hostile environment
28. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (specifying that the failure to make "reasonable
accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified [disabled]
employee" is a form of discrimination).
29. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3) (2000) ("To determine the appropriate reasonable
accommodation it may be necessary for the covered entity to initiate an informal, interactive process
with the qualified individual with a disability....").
30. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (prohibiting discrimination against only a "qualified individual with
a disability"); id § 12111(8) (defining "[q]ualified individual with a disability").
31. See id § 12102(2).
32. See, e.g., McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 278-87 (1976) (holding that
the race discrimination provision of Title VII prohibits discrimination against white people as well as
black people); Young v. S.W. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 509 F.2d 140, 1444-45 (5th Cir. 1975) (holding
that religious discrimination provision of Title VII prohibits discrimination against members of
specific religions as well as atheists); Sibley Mem'l Hosp. v. Wilson, 488 F.2d 1338, 1340-41 (D.C.
Cir. 1973) (holding that sex discrimination provision of Title VII prohibits discrimination against
men as well as women).
33. See, e.g., Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 903-04 (1lth Cir. 1982) (listing elements
of a hostile environment sex discrimination case under Title VI1).
34. See Moylan v. Manes County, 792 F.2d 746,749 (8th Cir. 1986) (noting that whether plaintiff
belongs to protected class is "not usually disputed").
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harassment doctrine. Indeed, neither the Fox nor the Flowers court
paused to consider the theory underlying the ADA or to indicate whether
or how the analysis of a hostile environment claim under the ADA might
differ from that of a corresponding claim under Title VII. This Article
takes that pause.
It argues that because the two statutes prohibit discrimination in such
fundamentally different ways, courts must resist the temptation to copy
and paste Title VII doctrine into ADA hostile environment opinions. The
standard elements of a Title VII hostile environment harassment claim
raise new and complex issues when analyzed in the context of the ADA.
While a quick glance at similar Title VII language allowed the Fourth
and Fifth Circuits correctly to determine that the ADA also prohibits
workplace harassment, the quick glances must end there. Title VII
doctrine and its underlying notions of equality and discrimination simply
cannot effectively answer many of the difficult questions likely to arise
in future ADA harassment cases. This Article identifies these questions
after reviewing the differing theories of equality that inform Title VII
and the ADA. It then suggests an analysis of ADA hostile environment
harassment claims that is consistent with the specific combination of
theories underlying that statute.
Part II of this Article analyzes the theoretical development of hostile
environment harassment claims under Title VII as a mechanism to
promote workplace equality. Because the great majority of Title VII
harassment cases allege sex discrimination, this Part focuses upon sex as
a protected characteristic. Next, Part IllI examines the modem notions of
disability and equality underlying the ADA and analyzes how the
statute's provisions-particularly the reasonable accommodation and
protected class provisions-coincide with these notions. Part IV of this
article then dissects the traditional elements of a Title VII hostile
environment harassment claim and notes how the theory and framework
of the ADA raise unique issues regarding these elements. Part IV also
proposes how these new issues could be addressed in a manner that
recognizes the specific theories of equality upon which ADA rests.
Finally, Part V offers some concluding thoughts.
1. FORMAL EQUALITY AND THE EVOLUTION OF THE
HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT HARASSMENT CLAIM UNDER
TITLE VII
Title VII secures civil rights in the workplace by requiring employers
to treat similarly situated employees the same, despite differences that
Vol. 77:575, 2002
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may exist among them in terms of race, sex, national origin, and
religion.3 The statute prohibits differential treatment based upon these
classifications because they do not normally affect an employee's ability
to perform at the workplace. This theory of equality, which also
underlies other legislation such as Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
196436 and Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972,"7 is often
referred to as "formal equality."'3
Title VII strays only occasionally from a strict formal equality model.
For example, the statute's bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ)
exception allows an employer to factor sex, national origin, and religion
(but not race) into hiring decisions if the employer can prove that those
characteristics are necessary to enable an employee to perform a
particular job.39 For example, it may be a BFOQ for an actor to be male if
his job is to portray a specific male character in a film.4 However,
because the great majority of jobs do not require employees to have a
particular sex, national origin, or religion, the BFOQ exception does not
result in frequent departures from the formal equality model.4"
An arguably even narrower exception to the formal equality mandate
of Title VII appears in the statute's religious accommodation
requirement.4 2 Because the First Amendment ordinarily prohibits
compulsory accommodation of any religious practice, the U.S. Supreme
Court has interpreted this statutory provision very narrowly, holding that
35. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). "The core of the Civil Rights Act [of 1964] is the 'race neutral'
principle, pursuant to which an individual's race is irrelevant and must be ignored when making
employment decisions affecting that individual... !' Tucker, supra note 26, at 362-63.
36. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (prohibiting discrimination on the basis of race and national origin in
programs and activities receiving federal financial assistance).
37. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-88 (1994).
38. See, e.g., Martha Chamallas, Deepening the Legal Understanding of Bias: On Devaluation
and Biased Prototypes, 74 S. CAL. L. REv. 747, 747-8 (2001) (noting that anti-discrimination law
expressly bans policies setting forth different standards for disfavored groups, but that "[a]side from
this insistence on formal or facial equality,. . . the protection of the law is thin"); Mayerson & Yee,
supra note 26, at 538 (explaining that "[u]nder formal equality, the law treats similarly situated
persons the same" and that underlying this model is the notion "that goods should be distributed
according to merit and all individuals are able to compete equally if treated equally"); Katherine M.
Franke, What's Wrong with Sexual Harassment?, 49 STAN. L. REv. 691,705 (1997) (stating that the
"dominant guiding principle in antidiscrimination jurisprudence is that of formal equality").
39. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e).
40. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(a)(2).
41. See ROTHSrEiN, supra note 27, at 208-13 (reviewing case law and emphasizing the
narrowness of the circumstances in which the BFOQ defense is available).
42. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (1994)-
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employers have no duty to provide accommodations that would involve
more than a de minimis cost.43 Thus, the few instances in which Title VII
allows differential treatment on the basis of protected characteristics are
tightly circumscribed. Overall, the driving theory of Title VII is one of
formal equality, and it is within the context of this theory that the hostile
environment harassment claim originated and developed.
A. Origins of the Hostile Environment Claim
One way in which Title VII jurisprudence seeks to implement formal
equality at the workplace is by prohibiting employers from creating
abusive workplace conditions that target a particular race, sex, national
origin, or religion. Such conduct is "hostile environment" harassment,
and, through a series of federal appellate decisions, it has been
recognized as a form of employment discrimination prohibited by Title
VII.4 The Fifth Circuit, in Rogers v. EEOC," was the first federal
appellate court to hold that "the relationship between an employee and
his working environment is of such significance as to be entitled to
statutory protection." 6 In Rogers, Ms. Josephine Chavez, a woman of
Hispanic origin who had worked in an optometrist's office, filed a
discrimination complaint with the EEOC, charging in part that her
employer segregated its Hispanic patients.4' She did not allege, however,
that her employer required her to attend only to the Hispanic patients,4s
and the trial court therefore held that Ms. Chavez could not state a
discrimination claim under Title VII.49
The Fifth Circuit disagreed, noting that Title VII specifically
proscribes discrimination "against any individual with respect to his
43. See Trans World Airlines v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 84 (1977). For an insightful comparison
of Title VII's religious accommodation provision with the reasonable accommodation provision of
the ADA, see Malloy, supra note 26, at 627-40.
44. "The hostile environment theory itself was not one that Congress anticipated or provided for
in the express terms of Title VII, but instead is one that scholars, the E.E.O.C., and judges have
fashioned in acknowledgment of a very real and invidious form of sex discrimination in the
workplace." DeClue v. Cent. Ill. Light Co., 223 F.3d 434, 439-40 (7th Cir. 2000) (Rovner, J.,
dissenting in part).
45. 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971).
46. Id. at 237-38.
47. Id. at 236-37.
48. Id. at 237.
49. Rogers v. EEOC, 316 F. Supp. 422,425 (E.D. Tex. 1970).
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compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, '5' and
that such language evinces "a Congressional intent to define
discrimination in the broadest possible terms."" The court therefore held
that Title VII protects "employees' psychological as well as economic
fringes" from employer abuse, and that the statute's reference to "'terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment' ... sweeps within its protective
ambit the practice of creating a working environment heavily charged
with ethnic or racial discrimination." ' 2 In addition, the Fifth Circuit noted
that the employer's possible violation of Title VII with respect to Ms.
Chavez did not depend upon whether it intended to discriminate against
her personally in segregating its patients.53 However, the court also
recognized the possibility that "an employer's patient discrimination may
constitute a subtle scheme designed to create a working environment
imbued with discrimination and directed ultimately at minority group
employees."'
In sum, Rogers established that an employer whose conduct creates a
work environment characterized by discrimination against any race, sex,
national origin, or religion is in fact discriminating against any
employees who belong to the targeted group. This proposition is
consistent with the formal equality model explained above because
employees in the targeted group experience the hostility of their
environment more forcefully and personally than do their colleagues. In
this situation, the targeted-group employees receive different-and thus
discriminatory-treatment at the workplace because of their protected
characteristic.55
50. Rogers, 454 F.2d at 238 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l)).
51. ld.
52. ld. The court went on to hold that "the possibility that petitioner's segregation of its patients
could encompass an unlawful employment practice justifies an EEOC investigation." Id. at 240.
53. 1d at 239.
54. Id.
55. After the Rogers decision, courts applied the Title VII hostile environment theory to cases
alleging unequal treatment because of race, e.g., Firefighters Inst. for Racial Equal. v. St. Louis, 549
F.2d 506, 514-15 (8th Cir. 1977); Gray v. Greyhound Lines, E., 545 F.2d 169, 176 (D.C. Cir. 1976);
sex, e.g., Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 944-45 (D.C. Cir. 1981); national origin, e.g., Cariddi v.
Kan. City Chiefs Football Club, 568 F.2d 87, 88 (8th Cit. 1977); and religion, e.g., Compston v.
Borden, Inc., 424 F. Supp. 157, 160-61 (S.D. Ohio 1976).
583
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B. Further Development of the Hostile Environment Claim in the
Context of Sex Discrimination Cases
In the years following Rogers, hostile environment doctrine under
Title VII became more nuanced as plaintiffs raised the theory in sex
discrimination cases. Sex-based harassment,56 unlike harassment based
on other characteristics, can occur in many forms and can sometimes
echo-or mock--expressions of interest or desire that would be socially
acceptable if welcomed by the recipient. The first form of sex-based
harassment to be tested in the courts concerned employers' requests for
sexual favors from employees in exchange for work-related benefits.
Originally, numerous courts adamantly refused to recognize these
propositions as an actionable form of sex discrimination, seeing them
merely as personal interactions involving sexual attractiveness rather
than gender. 7 Eventually, however, the federal judiciary became
persuaded that this "quid pro quo" sexual harassment, 8 at least,
constituted sex discrimination under the formal equality model of Title
VII.
In one of the earliest successful quid pro quo cases, Barnes v. Costle,59
the D.C. Circuit reasoned that "[b]ut for" the plaintiff's gender, "her
participation in sexual activity would never have been solicited. To say,
then, that she was victimized in her employment simply because she
56. Throughout this article, I will use the term "sex-based harassment" to refer both to harassing
conduct with sexual dimensions and to harassing conduct that is directed at a particular sex but not
necessarily sexual in nature. I will use the term "sexual harassment" to describe only conduct that is
sexual in nature.
57. See, e.g., Come v. Bausch & Lomb, 390 F. Supp. 161, 163 (D. Ariz. 1975), vacated on
procedural grounds, 562 F.2d 55 (9th Cir. 1977) (holding that sexual harassment stems merely from
a "personal proclivity, peculiarity or mannerism of the supervisor"); Miller v. Bank of Am., 418 F.
Supp. 233, 234 (N.D. Cal. 1976), rev'd, 600 F.2d 1211 (9th Cir. 1979) (holding that sexual
harassment is "essentially the isolated and unauthorized sex misconduct of one employee to
another"); Barnes v. Train, No. 1828-73, 1974 WL 10628, at *2 (D.D.C. Aug. 9, 1974), rev'd sub
nom Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (denying sexual harassment claim because
"substance of plaintiff's complaint is that she was discriminated against not because she was a
woman, but because she refused to engage in a sexual affair with her supervisor"). For an early
critique of cases refusing to hold sexual harassment actionable for these and other reasons, see Note,
Sexual Harassment and Title VII: The Foundation for the Elimination of Sexual Cooperation as an
Employment Condition, 76 MICH. L. REV. 1007, 1010-11 (1978). For a brief history of the judicial
acceptance of sexual harassment as actionable under Title VII, see BARBARA LINDEMANN & DAVID
D. KADUE, SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN EMPLOYMENT LAW 7-40 (1992).
58. For a general discussion of quid pro quo harassment, see LINDEMANN & KADUE, supra note
57, at 129-56.
59. 561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
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declined the invitation is to ignore... that she was invited only because
she was a woman subordinate to the inviter in the hierarchy of agency
personnel." 60 Thus, under the formal equality model, the employer in
Barnes had singled out the plaintiff for different treatment because of her
gender, and this different treatment amounted to discrimination.6'
Hostile environment harassment is distinguishable from the quid pro
quo harassment at issue in Barnes because it does not involve the
promise or withholding of economic benefits.62 Although these two
forms of harassment may occur simultaneously, 63 and the distinction
between them may not be as meaningful as it once appeared to be,64 the
two labels continue to be useful in allowing courts to describe and
analyze various harassment scenarios. 5
The Supreme Court first recognized a sex-based hostile environment
as actionable discrimination in Meitor Savings Bank v. Vinson,66 a case
involving egregious sexual conduct. In Meritor, the plaintiff, Mechelle
Vinson, testified that her supervisor at Meritor Savings Bank had
harassed her sexually over a period of years.67 Vinson's testimony
asserted that her supervisor had repeatedly requested sexual favors of
her, some of which, out of intimidation, she granted.68 She also testified
that her supervisor had fondled her in front of other employees, followed
her into the women's restroom, exposed himself to her, and forcibly
60. Id at 990 (footnotes omitted).
61. Three years after Barnes, in its 1980 Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, the EEOC
included quid pro quo scenarios in its description of actionable sexual harassment. See 45 Fed. Reg.
74,677 (1980) (now appearing at 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (a)(1)-(2) (2001)).
62. See LINDEMANN & KADUE, supra note 57, at 8-9.
63. For example, a supervisor may deny a female employee a promotion because of her refusal to
grant requested sexual favors and at the same time maintain a hostile environment by making
comments and creating policies that denigrate women.
64. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 754 (1998) (holding that quid pro
quolhostile environment distinction has no bearing on issue of vicarious employer liability for sex-
based harassment).
.65. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 753 ("We do not suggest the terms quid pro quo and hostile work
environment are irrelevant to Title VII litigation .... [The terms are relevant when there is a
threshold question whether a plaintiff can prove discrimination...').
66. 477 U.S. 57 (1986). Seven years before Meritor, Professor Catharine MacKinnon had first
theorized that quid pro quo and hostile environment (which she called "condition of work")
harassment were distinct but equally actionable forms of sex discrimination. CATHARINE
MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMiENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A CASE OF SEX DISCRIMINATION 32
(1979).
67. 477 U.S. at 60.
68. Id.
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raped her on several occasions. 9 In addition, Vinson asserted that her
supervisor touched and fondled other female employees of the bank.70
Vinson's suit sought compensatory damages-among other forms of
relief-for injuries allegedly caused by the harassment.7'
The Bank argued that when Congress referred to the "compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges" of employment in Title VII, it
contemplated only economic losses rather than psychological injuries.72
Drawing largely upon Rogers v. EEOC,3 the Court rejected this
argument, holding that "a plaintiff may establish a violation of Title VII
by proving that discrimination based on sex has created a hostile or
abusive work environment," even if the plaintiff has not suffered
financially from the discrimination. 74 This holding flowed logically from
the Court's initial assertion that "[w]ithout question, when a supervisor
sexually harasses a subordinate because of the subordinate's sex, that
supervisor 'discriminate[s]' on the basis of sex."'75
After Meritor, many sex-based hostile environment harassment cases
focused upon the level of abusiveness required to make the environment
actionably "hostile." The Supreme Court in Meritor had already
specifically declared that, to be actionable, sex-based harassment must be
"sufficiently severe or pervasive 'to alter the conditions of [the victim's]
employment and create an abusive working environment."' 76 Seven years
later, in Harris v. Forklift Systems,77 the Court clarified that a working
environment need not lead an employee to suffer serious psychological
harm in order to be actionably abusive.78 However, the Court specified
that the environment must be one that "a reasonable person would find
hostile or abusive" in order to violate Title VII.7 9 This standard, the Court
noted, followed the formal equality principle of the statute: "[T]he very
fact that the discriminatory conduct was so severe or pervasive that it
69. id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 64.
73. 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971).
74. 477 U.S. at 66.
75. Id. at 64.
76. Id. at 67 (quoting Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (11th Cir. 1982)) (brackets
added in Meritor).
77. 510 U.S. 17 (1993).
78. Id. at 21.
79. ld.
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created a work environment abusive to employees because of their race,
gender, religion, or national origin offends Title VII's broad rule of
workplace equality."8 Justice Scalia, in a concurrence, nevertheless
noted the generality of the majority's standard as a potential problem:
"Abusive" (or "hostile," which in this context I take to mean the
same thing) does not seem to me a very clear standard-and I do
not think clarity is at all increased by adding the adverb
"objectively" or by appealing to a "reasonable person['s]" notion of
what the vague word means....
Be that as it may, . . . . I know of no test more faithful to the
inherently vague statutory language than the one the Court today
adopts.81
Before Harris, in an attempt to focus the standard and to sensitize
courts to the possibly differing male and female reactions to sexual
words and acts, some advocates had proposed a "reasonable woman"
standard, 2 and some circuits had adopted it.83 After Harris, however,
several courts interpreted that case to require a "reasonable person" test
and therefore explicitly rejected or abandoned the reasonable woman
standard 4 In 1998, the Supreme Court announced in Oncale v.
g0. Id. at22.
81. Id. at 24 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Ginsburg, also concurring, suggested a gloss on the
majority's test that would make it both broader and more workable: "It suffices to prove that a
reasonable person subjected to the discriminatory conduct would find... that the harassment so
altered working conditions as to make it 'more difficult to do the job."' Id. at 25 (Ginsuburg, J.,
concurring) (quoting Davis v. Monsanto Chem. Co., 858 F.2d 345,349 (6th Cir. 1988)).
82. See, e.g., Kathryn Abrams, Gender Discrimination and the Transformation of Workplace
Norms, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1183, 1210 (1989); Caroline Forell, Essentialism, Empathy, and the
Reasonable Woman, 1994 U. ILL. L REV. 769; Deborah S. Brenneman, From Woman's Point of
View: The Use of the Reasonable Woman Standard in Sexual Harassment Cases, 60 U. CIN. L REV.
1281 (1992); Elizabeth A. Glidden, The Emergence of the Reasonable Woman in Combating Hostile
Environment Sexual Harassment, 77 IOWA L. REv. 1825 (1992); Note, Sexual Harassment Claims of
Abusive Work Environment Under Title VII, 97 HARV. L REV. 1449, 1459 (1984).
83. See, e.g., Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 879 (9th Cir. 1991); Andrews v. City of
Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1482 (3d Cir. 1990); Yates v. Avco Corp., 819 F.2d 630, 637 n.2 (6th
Cir. 1987).
84. See Bunch v. Shalala, No. 94-2269, 1995 WL 564385, at *8 (4th Cir. Sept. 25, 1995) (table
decision at 67 F.3d 293) (rejecting reasonable woman standard as contrary to Harris); Dey v. Colt
Constr. & Dev. Co., 28 F.3d 1446, 1454-55 (7th Cir. 1994) (same); DeAngelis v. El Paso Mun.
Police Officers Ass'n, 51 F.3d 591, 594 (5th Cir. 1995) (same). This reading of Harris may not be
entirely accurate. The majority opinion in Harris specifically noted that it "need not answer today all
the potential questions [that the objective standard] raises, nor specifically address the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission's new regulations on this subject" 510 U.S. at 22-23. Those
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Sundowner Offshore Services85 that "the objective severity of harassment
should be judged from the perspective of a reasonable person in the
plaintiff's position, considering 'all the circumstances."' 86 Implicitly
holding that a plaintiff s "position" and "circumstances" may include her
gender, the Ninth Circuit has specifically reaffirmed its use of a
reasonable woman standard in sex-based harassment cases involving
female plaintiffs.87
Whatever the post-Oncale status of the reasonable woman standard
may be, the test rests upon the premise that conduct that is acceptable
when directed at males may become unacceptable when directed at
females. This notion runs afoul of the formal equality principle in that it
allows for different treatment based upon sex. Some recent scholarship
has also criticized the reasonable woman standard on the ground that its
inherent essentialism presupposes a uniform manner in which women
should react to sexual situations.88 Indeed, one critic has noted that the
standard "resolves some of the sex-based bias in the law at the price of
potentially normalizing and enforcing certain gender stereotypes or
commonly accepted social norms. 89
Although Oncale did not resolve the reasonable woman issue, it did
alleviate some judicial confusion surrounding the "based on sex"
element. Before Oncale, many courts had held that harassment was based
proposed regulations, later withdrawn, specified that under the "reasonable person" standard,
"consideration is to be given to the perspective of individuals of the claimant's ... gender." EEOC
PROPOSED GUIDELINES ON HARASSMENT BASED ON RACE, COLOR, RELIGION, GENDER, NATIONAL
ORIGIN, AGE, OR DISABILrrY, 58 FED. REG. 51,266, at 51,267 (proposed Oct. 1, 1993).
85. 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
86. Id. at 81 (quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993)).
87. Brooks v. City of San Mateo, 229 F.3d 917, 924 (9th Cir. 2000) (relying on a "reasonable
victim" perspective and citing with approval "reasonable woman" standard from Ellison v. Brady,
924 F.2d 872, 879 (9th Cir. 1991)). See also Weston v. Pennsylvania, 251 F.3d 420, 426 (3d Cir.
2001) (holding that a plaintiff must prove that allegedly hostile environment would detrimentally
affect a "reasonable person of the same sex in that position"); DeClue v. Cent. Ill. Light Co., 223
F.3d 434, 438 (7th Cir. 2000) (Rovner, J., dissenting in part) (stating that when "an employer fails to
correct a work condition that it knows or should know has a disparate impact on its female
employees-that reasonable women would find intolerable-it is arguably fostering a work
environment that is hostile to women").
88. See Anita Bernstein, Treating Sexual Harassment with Respect, 111 HARv. L. REv. 445, 471-
77 (1997). Bernstein advocates the use of a "respectful person" standard, which she argues would
strike at the denial of human dignity inherent in sexual harassment. ld. at 450. See also Nancy S.
Ehrenreich, Pluralist Myths and Powerless Men: The Ideology of Reasonableness in Sexual
Harassment Law, 99 YALE L.J. 1177, 1214-25 (1990) (criticizing the reasonable woman standard as
being unable to overcome the inter-gender conflict that it purports to resolve).
89. Franke, supra note 38, at 750.
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on sex only if it stemmed from the harasser's sexual desire for the
target.90 This line of thinking led to the "disaggregation" of evidence in
plaintiffs' cases,91 in that courts would consider only sexual conduct with
respect to a harassment claim, leaving nonsexual but sex-based conduct
to be considered separately, in the context of a garden-variety disparate
treatment claim.92 A court employing this analysis essentially divided
and conquered a plaintiff's harassment claim by allowing the plaintiff to
present only part of the real harassment evidence.93 Oncale put an end to
this problem in 1998 by explicitly holding that sex-based harassment
need not be sexual in nature.94
In sum, formal equality principles, informed by an increasing
understanding of the nature of sex discrimination, have guided the Court
in its articulation of the components of a Title VII hostile environment
harassment action. While debate continues as to the finer details, 95 one
may glean the following core elements of such actions through a
synthesis of the Supreme Court's opinions in Meritor,96 Harris,97
Oncale,9' and Burlington Industries v. Ellerth:99
the employee must have suffered harassment so severe and
pervasive as to create a hostile or abusive working environment;"'
the employee must have reasonably perceived the environment
resulting from the harassment as hostile or abusive; t°1
90. See Vicld Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, 107 YALE LJ. 1683, 1710 (1998)
(explaining that "[t]o a large extent, the courts have restricted the conception of hostile work
environment harassment to male-female sexual advances and other explicitly sexualized actions
perceived to be driven by sexual designs").
91. See id. at 1713-14 (explaining concept of"disaggregation").
92. See id.L at 1716-20 (reviewing decisions that "disaggregated" nonsexual from sexual evidence
when analyzing sex-based harassment claims).
93. See id. at 1720-21.
94. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998).
95. For example, some circuits require plaintiffs to prove that the conduct complained of was
"unwelcome." See, e.g., Cain v. Blackwell, 246 F.3d 758, 760 (5th Cir. 2001); Wanchik v. Great
Lakes Health Plan, Inc., No. 99-2333, 2001 WL 223742, *7 (6th Cir. March 2, 2001) (table decision
at 248 F.3d 1154). However, the "unwelcomeness" requirement appears to be superfluous, given that
the test already requires plaintiffs to prove their subjective belief that the conduct in question created
an abusive or hostile environment. See Harris v. Forklift Sys., 510 U.S. 17, 21-22 (1993).
96. 477 U.S. 57.
97. 510U.S. 17.
98. 523 U.S. 75.
99. 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
100. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67 (citing Henson v. Dundee, 682 F.2d 897,904 (lth Cir. 1982)).
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the harassment must have been based on a protected characteristic
of the employee;10 2 and
the employer must have been responsible, at least vicariously, for
the harassment.
0 3
C. The Formal Equality Model in Scholarly Debate Surrounding Sex-
Based Hostile Environment Cases
Recent scholarship regarding these elements has also invoked formal
equality principles in attempting to locate the true harm inherent in sex-
based hostile environment harassment."0 4 In doing so, it has shed new
light on the relation between the formal equality model and the nature of
Title VII hostile environment claims. Professor Katherine Franke, for
example, has examined the nature of harassment that takes a specifically
sexual form in light of formal equality notions.' She has argued that
because the formal equality theory conceptualizes different treatment of
similarly situated individuals as the gravamen of discrimination, courts
applying this theory to sexual harassment cases have mistakenly
analyzed causation by determining merely whether the employee would
not have received the different and abusive treatment but for her or his
sex. t0 6 This test actually views the harassment from the abuser's
perspective, as if its inherent wrong stemmed from the abuser's desire for
101. Courts must evaluate the hostility or abusiveness of the environment from both the plaintiff's
subjective perspective and from an objectively "reasonable" perspective. Harris, 510 U.S. at 21-22.
102. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 66 (reviewing with approval lower court decisions analyzing
harassment based on race, religion, and national origin, and holding sex-based harassment similarly
actionable); Oncale, 523 U.S. at 81 (explaining operation of sex as a protected characteristic).
103. See generally Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (determining controlling agency law principles with
respect to employer liability for workplace harassment). An employer is vicariously liable for a
hostile environment created by a supervisor with immediate or successively higher authority over the
harassed employee. Id. at 765; Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998). However,
an employer may raise in defense that it took reasonable care to prevent and promptly correct the
harassment and that the employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of opportunities to prevent
or correct the harassment. Ellerth 524 U.S. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807. An employer is liable
for harassment by a plaintiff's co-workers if it knew or should have known about the harassment but
negligently failed to take prompt remedial action. See, e.g., Baskerville v. Culligan Int'l, 50 F.3d
428, 431-32 (7th Cir. 1995). See also BARBARA LINDEMANN & DAVID D. KADUE, SEXUAL
HARASSMENT IN EMPLOYMENT LAW 18 (Supp. 1999) (describing liability standard in co-worker
harassment cases).
104. See generally Franke, supra note 38; Schultz, supra note 90.
105. See generally Franke, supra note 38.
106. Franke, supra note 38, at 704 n.52.
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someone of a particular sex, a desire expressed in an inappropriate place,
and, perhaps, in an inappropriate way. 7 Sexual harassment, however, is
primarily about "power, privilege, or dominance," rather than desire."t°
Indeed, Franke describes sexual harassment as "a technology of gender
discrimination ' 0 9 that "inscribes, enforces, and polices a particular view
of who women and men should be.""0 Therefore, according to Franke, to
strike at the real inequity of sexual harassment, courts should analyze the
"based on sex" element by asking whether the harassment enforced
stereotypical views of the target's gender or punished the target for not
complying with the stereotype."'
While Franke declares that the formal equality model yields an
inadequate framework within which to analyze sexual harassment
cases," 2 her own theory in fact depends heavily upon that model.
Fundamentally, Franke argues that employers should accord similar
treatment to employees who happen to comply with traditional gender
stereotypes and those who do not, provided that the employees are
otherwise similarly situated. This similar treatment is nothing more than
formal equality in action. Thus, in her review of hostile environment
jurisprudence, Franke is criticizing not the formal equality model itself
but rather the manner in which courts have applied it. According to
Franke, courts should not ask whether a defendant treated people he
found sexually attractive differently from those he did not. Instead, they
should ask whether the defendant treated those who failed to conform to
gender stereotypes differently from those who did.
Other theories regarding the inherent wrong in sex-based harassment
rely more explicitly on the formal equality model. Professor Vicki
Schultz, for example, argues that the true invidiousness of this type of
harassment lies in its ability to maintain some workplaces as male
preserves by undercutting the perceived and actual competence of female
employees who dare to enter them." 3 She notes numerous strategies that
107. Id. at 745.
108. Id
109. d at771.
110. Id
111. Id. at 772. The Supreme Court, in Oncale, has since clarified that sex-based harassment need
not stem from sexual desire and that it may therefore be perpetrated by heterosexuals against their
own sex. 523 U.S. at 79-81. The Court did not, however, address Franke's notion that "because of
sex" could mean "because of deviation from sex-based stereotypes."
112- Franke, supra note 38, at 693.
113. See generally Schultz, supra note 90.
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employers have used to undermine and intimidate women at work, such
as failing to provide them with adequate training or simply assigning
them tasks that are impossible to accomplish." 4 These strategies are not
sexual in nature and do not involve express references to the targeted
employees' gender, yet they are aimed exclusively at women in an
attempt to drive them from the workplace.
While courts including the Seventh Circuit have held that evidence of
sex-based hostile environments-such as abusive language and
conduct-must expressly implicate the complainant's gender,"5 Schultz
joins other theorists and commentators who argue that express references
to sexuality or gender may facilitate proof of the "based on sex" element
but are not prerequisites to a finding of discriminatory harassment. 1 6 In
Schultz's view, the discriminatory aspect of sex-based harassment turns
114. Id. at 1764-66.
115. Galloway v. Gen. Motors Serv. Parts Operations, 78 F.3d 1164, 1167-68 (1996). In
Galloway the Seventh Circuit held that a plaintiff failed to state a claim where her allegations of
harassment referred to epithets and a gesture that, according to the court, were not "sex- or gender-
related." Id. at 1167. Oddly, given that holding, one of the epithets at issue was "sick bitch," and the
gesture, while not described explicitly, was "obscene" and was directed at the plaintiff along with
the words "suck this, bitch." Id. at 1165.
116. See Schultz, supra note 90, at 1800 (noting that "even an apparently gender-neutral act of
hazing" could constitute sex-based harassment in a workplace characterized by longstanding gender
inequality). See also Ruth Colker, Whores, Fags, Dumb-Ass Women, Surly Blacks, and Competent
Heterosexual White Men: The Sexual and Racial Morality Underlying Anti-Discrimination Doctrine,
7 YALE J. L. & FEMINISM 195, 224 (1995) ("It is as pernicious to call a woman 'stupid' as it is to call
her 'sexy.' Both comments should be illegal when based on gender stereotypes."); LINDEMANN &
KADUE, supra note 57, at 30:
Hostile environment cases .... present situations that, like quid pro
quo cases, involve disparate treatment based on an employee's
gender. In one common situation, women employees, often in
occupations or workplaces traditionally dominated by men, are
subjected to hazing behaviors: scorn, ridicule, and verbal abuse from
males who resent their presence. The behavior consists of gestures,
words, or conduct that may or may not be sexual in content. The
sexual content of the conduct may suffice, but it is never necessary,
to prove that the conduct is based on sex.
The "Sexual Harassment" section of the EEOC's 1980 Guidelines, 29 C.F.R. §1604.11, focused only
on sexual conduct when discussing hostile environment theory, see id. §1604.11(a), but a later
Policy Guidance issued to EEOC field officers clarified that "sex-based harassment-that is,
harassment not involving sexual activity or language-may also give rise to Title VII liability Oust
as in the case of harassment based on race, national origin or religion)." EEOC POLICY GUIDANCE
ON CURRENT SEXUAL HARASSMENT ISSUES (March 19, 1990), reprinted in LINDEMANN & KADUE,
supra, note 57, at 661, 672. This Policy Guidance implies that comments not explicitly referring to
the victim's gender can create a hostile environment, but it does not address the issue squarely.
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on gender-related stereotypes regarding workplace competence. n7 She
argues that a sex-based hostile environment exists when harassment
pressures employees "to conform to the harassers' image of suitable
manly competence" regarding a particular job."8 In the end, Schultz's
argument is also one for similar treatment of similarly situated
employees. Her competence-based paradigm is designed to prohibit an
employer from confronting female and "overly feminine" male"9
employees with gratuitous hurdles that their co-workers would never
encounter. In this sense, her proposal is a call for a more broadly based
application of formal equality principles.
Thus, Title VII hostile environment jurisprudence, like most anti-
discrimination law in this country, 20 has evolved and continues to be
debated in relation to the formal equality model. Moreover, given the
unfortunate recent tendency of many courts and much of the public to
misinterpret anti-discrimination provisions as granting "special rights"
and preferential treatment,12' Title VII jurisprudence, including hostile
environment doctrine, is likely to hew very closely to the formal equality
model for the foreseeable future.
II. EQUAL OPPORTUNITY AS A SUPPLEMENT TO FORMAL
EQUALITY IN THE ADA
The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, a "second-generation"
civil rights statute," has brought a new model of equality to employment
discrimination law. Certainly, Title I of the ADA, which governs
employment, incorporates formal equality principles by prohibiting
discrimination on the basis of disability with respect to "job application
procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees,
employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and
117. Schultz, supra note 90, at 1800.
118. Id. at 1774.
119. while Schultz focuses her argument on the need to prohibit conduct aimed at excluding
women from male-dominated workplaces, she also demonstrates that the same argument applies to
conduct aimed at effeminate men. Id. at 1774-89.
120. "Antidiscrimination law, of course, is animated by the very idea of equal treatment." Peter J.
Rubin, Equal Rights. Special Rights, and the Nature of Antidiscrimination Law, 97 MICH. L. REV.
564,566 (1998).
121. See generally i&
122. Burgdorf, supra note 26, at 415.
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privileges of employment."" I Thus, as long as disabled employees are
qualified,"2 their employers may not disadvantage them with respect to
similarly situated co-workers by according them differential treatment
because of their disabilities. But the ADA then goes a step further and
implements a different model of equality; it also imposes upon
employers a duty to make "reasonable accommodations to the known
physical or mental limitations" of a disabled employee or job applicant,
provided that such accommodations do not cause "undue hardship."'t 2 A
reasonable accommodation might take the form of installing a ramp at
the entrance of a building to allow access to employees using
wheelchairs,1 26 purchasing a telephone amplifier for use by an employee
with a hearing impairment, 27 or allowing a diabetic employee to work
one shift permanently, rather than rotating shifts, so that she can maintain
a strict meal schedule.1
28
In requiring employers to take these types of affirmative steps, the
ADA supplements the formal equality model with an "equal
opportunity" model of its own. 29 Instead of requiring employers to treat
all employees similarly, the statute's reasonable accommodation
provision actually requires employers to accord facially different
treatment to disabled employees so that they and their nondisabled peers
may have equal opportunities to demonstrate their capabilities in the
123. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (1994).
124. See id. § 12111(8) (defining a "qualified individual with a disability" as one "who, with or
without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment position
that [he or she] holds or desires").
125. Id. § 12112(b)(5)(A).
126. See EEOC, A TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL ON THE EMPLOYMENT PROVISIONS (TITLE
I) OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT § 1-3.10(1) (1992), reprinted in RUTH COLKER &
BONNIE POITRAS TUCKER, THE LAW OF DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION HANDBOOK: STATUTES AND
REGULATORY GUIDANCE 41, 64 (1995).
127. Id. at § 1-3.10(6), reprinted in COLKER &TUCKER, supra note 126, at 67-68.
128. Id. at § 1-3.10(3), reprinted in COLKER & TUCKER, supra note 126, at 66.
129. Arlene Mayerson, one of the ADA's drafters, has explained that she and the other drafters
"conceptualized equal protection as equal opportunity." Mayerson & Yee, supra note 26, at 537.
Robert L. Burgdorf, Jr., another ADA drafter, has referred to the equal opportunity model as one of
"real, not merely formal, equality." DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT LAW 274 (1995).
Whatever label one might apply to its underlying model, "[t]he reasonable accommodation
requirement ... is based upon a more complex and richer conception of equality than a simple
requirement that the disabled and nondisabled be treated the same." Diller, supra note 26, at 40.
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workplace. 3' The ADA also differs from earlier formal equality-based
civil rights legislation in that it provides its protections, including the
right to reasonable accommodation, only to members of a specifically
defined group.' The following sections will analyze the ADA's equal
opportunity model by tracing its sources and examining its
implementation through the statute's reasonable accommodation and
protected class provisions.
A. Theories of Disability and the Equal Opportunity Model
The ADA's equal opportunity model emerged from a rethinking of the
entire notion of disability. Before the disability rights movement came
together in the late 1960s and early 1970s,132 the commonly accepted
paradigm of disability was based upon a medical model.'33 Under the
medical model, disability was viewed as a measurable biological fact and
thus "an inherent individual defect."',34 Therefore, the primary duty of
people with disabilities was to seek cures or rehabilitation through
modem science so that they could rid themselves of their defects and join
the nondisabled community.'35 Impairments were to be eradicated, rather
than accommodated. Thus, the medical model often obliged people with
disabilities to make heroic physical efforts to look and act like
130. See BURGDORF, supra note 129, at 274 (noting "where people's disabilities do situate them
differently regarding employment opportunities, identical treatment may be a source of
discrimination, and different treatment may be required to eliminate it!').
131. Tifle I prohibits an employer from discriminating only against a "qualified individual vth a
disability." 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (1994). "Disability" is defined as "a physical or mental impairment
that substantially limits one or more of the major life activites" or "a record of such an impairment,"
or the state of "being regarded as having such an impairment." Id. at § 12102(2).
132. For detailed accounts of the disability rights movement, see FRED PELKA, THE DISABILITY
RIGHTS MOVEMENT (1997) (providing an encyclopedic treatment of significant events, persons, and
organizations in the movement); JOSEPH P. SHAPIRO, No PITY: PEOPLE wrH DISABILITIES FORGING
A NEW CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT (1993) (providing a comprehensive history of the movement).
133. For an excellent critical discussion of the medical model of disability, see Anita Silvers,
Formal Justice, in ANITA SILVERS ET AL., DISABILITY, DIFFERENCE, DISCRIMINATION:
PERSPECtivES ON JUSTICE IN BIOETHiCS AND PUBLIC POLICY 13, 59-74 (1998).
134. Paula E. Berg, Ill/Legal: Interrogating the Meaning and Function of the Category of
Disability in Antidiscrimination Law, 1 YALE L. & POL REV. 1, 7 (1999) (discussing shortcomings
of the medical model of disability).
135. See Mary Crossley, The Disability Kaleidoscope, 74 NOTRE DAME L REV. 621, 650 (1999)
(noting that under the medical model, the best way to help individuals with disabilities is through
medicine and rehabilitative therapy).
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nondisabled people.'36 This mandate to become "normal" turned disabled
people into patients who had to undergo therapy so that they could
function like the rest of society, even if they had already found their own
ways to function effectively. 37 To the extent that a disabled person had
problems adjusting to environments designed for people with few or no
impairments, the fault lay in the disabled person and not in the
environments. 138
The medical model still drives some of our thinking regarding the
nature of disability today. 139 Nevertheless, over the past several decades,
it has come under increasing attack by disability theorists. 40 While many
therapies promoted by the medical model bring tremendous benefits to
people with disabilities, such as alleviating pain and improving function,
critics have argued that the model itself has caused and continues to
136. Joseph Shapiro reports that in the 1950s, society rewarded people with polio who rejected
wheelchairs and built up their muscles so that they could walk like nondisabled people (albeit with
braces and crutches). See SHAPIRO, supra note 132, at 15-16. Doctors at that time had recommended
crutches over wheelchairs not because they had evidence that walking was physically more
beneficial, but simply because "sociologically it was expected." Id. at 16. Ironically, decades later,
those who built the most muscle found that their muscles atrophied the fastest. Id. Cynthia Griggins,
a rehabilitation specialist, has noted more recent societal attitudes consistent with this anecdote:
"Somehow, a quadriplegic who is working and learning to dress himself (even though it may take
him half a day) is more palatable than a quadriplegic who is doing nothing. It's bad enough that they
can't contribute to society-at least they can look busy!" Cynthia Griggins, The Disabled Face a
Schizophrenic Society, in DISABLED PEOPLE AS SECOND-CLASS CITIZENS 30, 37 (Myron G.
Eisenberg et al. eds., 1982).
137. See SILVERS, supra note 133, at 62 (noting that medical model, whose therapeutic goal is to
allow disabled people to function as nondisabled people do, wrongly compares modes of
performance without considering their actual effectiveness); Crossley, supra note 135, at 650
(stating that "[tihe individual's own subjective experience of impairment or limitation is irrelevant"
under the medical model).
138. See SILVERS, supra note 133, at 74 ("The medical model treats the built and arranged
environment as an invariable to which humans have no choice but to adjust."). Because the medical
model views environments that are tailored for nondisabled people as being value-neutral, it
resembles the model of "transparent" white racism constructed by Prof. Barbara J. Flagg. See
Fashioning a Title VII Remedy for Transparently White Subjective Decisionmaking, 104 YALE L.J.
2009, 2013 (1995). Flagg's model posits that white-based thinking is so embedded in U.S. culture
that the social environments it creates appear racially neutral to the majority of the population. Id. at
2035-36.
139. See Crossley, supra note 135, at 653 ("MI'he medical model of disability still appears firmly
ensconced in our collective societal understanding of disability.").
140. See, e.g., Paul K. Longmore & Laud Umansky, Disability History: From the Margins to the
Mainstream, in THE NEW DISABILITY HISTORY: AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES (Paul K. Longmore &
Laud Umansky eds., 2001) (criticizing the medical model of disability); SILVERS. supra note 133, at
59-64 (same); LENNARD J. DAVIS, ENFORCING NORMALCY: DISABILITY, DEAFNESS, AND THE BODY
2-3 (1995) (describing flaws inherent in biological interpretations of disability).
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cause significant problems. These critics have noted that the medical
model fosters dependency on the part of people with disabilities, who
may yield much of their own decisionmaking to physicians and other
medical personnel.
141
In addition, the medical model places people with disabilities in the
position of passive recipients of charity by excusing them from working
until therapy brings them to the point where they can function
productively in a "normal" setting.'42 Further, by creating normative
categories of "disabled" and "nondisabled," the model inevitably
stigmatizes disabled people as inferior human beings. 43 Therapeutic
efforts then respond to this stigma by attempting to make disabled people
more closely resemble the nondisabled majority, ineptly "leveling the
players rather than the playing field."'"
Indeed, because such therapies tend to focus more on appearances
than actual abilities, they can amount to nothing more than high-cost,
low-effect solutions to basic functional problems. 45 Moreover, to the
extent that therapy may never enable certain disabled people to blend in
with the rest of the population, the medical model tends to segregate
them even further by consigning them to long-term care facilities. 46
Lastly, the most significant shortcoming of the medical model of
disability is its failure to recognize the relativity of the social context in
which people with disabilities are supposed to function:
141. See generally Griggins, supra note 136 (arguing health and rehabilitation professionals must
respect ability of disabled people to make decisions regarding how to live their lives).
142. See Berg, supra note 134, at7.
143. See Crossley, supra note 135, at 649-50 (explaining that the medical model views disabled
people as "innately, biologically different and inferior"). However, with respect to stigma, the
medical model of disability certainly improves upon the historic morality-based model, which it
replaced. Under the earlier model, the cause of the disabling impairment was thought to be the
sinfulness or moral impurity of the affected individual. Berg, supra note 134, at 5-6.
144. See SIVERS, supra note 133, at 70.
145. As an example of this phenomenon, disability activist Nancy Eiesland recounts the story of
Diane DeVries, who wore upper and lower prosthetic devices during her childhood at the urging of
doctors, to '"ormalize" her functioning. After trying twelve pairs of arms, DeVries abandoned them,
finding them "'more of a hassle than a help."' NANcY L EtESLAND, THE DISABLED GOD: TOWARD
A LIBERATORY TIMOLOGY OF DISABILiTY 37 (1994) (quoting an interview with Diane DeVries).
Because DeVries could eat, drink, and play much better without the arms, she "felt more disabled
and less independent with the devices than without them." Id.
146. Silvers notes that in accordance with policies stemming from the medical model, those who
are not cured are "sequestered from society for the purpose of their continued medical treatment"
SILVERS, supra note 133, at 66.
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The dominant [nondisabled] group's fashions of functioning are not
the product of any biological mandate or evolutionary triumph, nor
are they naturally endowed to be optimally effective and efficient.
Rather, members of this group impose on others a social or
communal situation that best suits themselves, regardless of
whether it is the most productive option for everyone.... [T]he
main ingredient of being (perceived as) normal lies in being in
social situations that suit one-that is, in a social environment
arranged for and accustomed to people like oneself. Thus, ...
programmatic normalization-the equalizing strategy promoted by
the medical model of disability-lends itself to oppression because
it validates and further imposes the dominant social group's
preferences and biases. 47
This last criticism has given rise to a new paradigm that casts
disability as a mere socially-constructed phenomenon rather than a
biological fact. The paradigm posits that society's classification of some
people as "disabled" and others as "nondisabled" is entirely arbitrary
because it is based only upon relative notions of the tasks that human
beings should be able to perform and how they should be able to perform
them.'48 Instead of fixed categories, "disabled" and "nondisabled" are at
most fictional endpoints along a continuum of human abilities. 49 To the
extent that society has drawn a line on that continuum to indicate where
"disability" begins, the placement of that line is baseless. So too,
147. Id. at 73-74.
148. See UNITED STATES COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, ACCOMMODATING THE SPECTRUM OF
INDIVIDUAL ABILITIES 90 (1983) ("Concepts of normality and abnormality and of ability and
disability have no real meaning unless they are considered in the context of the nature and purpose
of a particular task or activity."); Robert L. Burgdorf, Jr., Who Are "Handicapped" Persons?; in
THE LEGAL RIGHTS OF HANDICAPPED PERSONS: CASES MATERIALS, AND TEXT, 11 (Robert L.
Burgdorf, Jr. ed., 1980) ("[C]ertain traits have been singled out and called handicaps. The fine line
between handicapped and normal has been arbitrarily drawn by the 'normal' majority." (footnote
omitted)).
149. See Robert L. Burgdorf, Jr., "Substantially Limited" Protection from Disability
Discrimination: The Special Treatment Model and Misconstructions of the Definition of Disability,
42 VIL. L. REV. 409, 519-22 (1997) (discussing the spectrum of human abilities). See also DAVIS,
supra note 140, at xv (noting that categories such as "disabled" are "products of a society invested in
denying the variability of the body"); MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE 95 (1990)
(explaining that disabled people, among others, experience the "dilemma of difference" when the
status quo "refuses to make room for a range of human conditions").
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therefore, is the idea that people on the "disabled" side of the line are
somehow abnormal and inferior' so
This "social construct" paradigm shifts the locus of responsibility for
the problems faced by people with disabilities from the disabled people
to their inhospitable environments. It has thus led to a new understanding
of the nature of disability-based discrimination. If disability is an artifice
of social construction, then societal discrimination-rather than
disabilities themselves-must account for the disadvantaged social and
economic status of many disabled people.151
Indeed, the dominant nondisabled society has constructed a world
tailored to the needs of people without physical and mental impairments,
and this world largely ignores the needs of the disabled. This
construction of the world was not inevitable, however, and its continuing
conscious or unconscious failure to consider the spectrum of human
needs and abilities is itself discriminatory. 152 Disabled and nondisabled
people are equally entitled to accessible environments in which they can
demonstrate their talents and abilities. Therefore, if the dominant
nondisabled community must adapt current environments to provide
disabled people with equal opportunities to flourish, then it must do so
not as a matter of charity but as a matter of civil rights. 53
150. Disability historian Henri-Jacques Stiker has rejected normalizing notions of abnormality
and disability:
I simply believe that disability happens to humanity and that there are no
grounds for conceiving of it as an aberration. Life and biology have their share
of risks, as does life in society.... [IMnstead of presenting [disability] as an
anomaly or as an abnormality, I conceive of it in the first place as a reality.
A HISTORY OF DISABILITY 12 (William Sayers trans., Univ. of Michigan Press 1999).
151. For a thorough discussion of the social and economic status of disabled people in the years
leading up to the passage of the ADA, see Burgdorf, supra note 26, at 415-26.
152. See Burgdorf, supra note 149, at 517-18 (noting that the structuring of "services, facilities,
programs and opportunities" to meet the needs of nondisabled people, while ignoring the needs of
those with disabilities, constitutes discrimination). See also DAVIS, supra note 140, at 10 C" [I]n an
ableist society, the 'normal' people have constructed the world physically and cognitively to reward
those with like abilities and handicap those with unlike abilities."); MINOW, supra note 149, at 80
(explaining that "[existing arrangements that make some traits stand out as different are neither
natural nor necessary; the relationship between the status quo and the assignment of difference can
be renovated").
153. See Crossley, supra note 135, at 659 (describing "civil rights approach" to increasing
participation of people with disabilities in society).
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B. The ADA's Implementation of the Equal Opportunity Model
The ADA implements the equal opportunity model-and differs
structurally from prior civil rights legislation such as Title VII-
primarily through its inclusion of two specific provisions: the reasonable
accommodation requirement and the protected class definition. The
discussions below trace the legislative roots of these two statutory
provisions and examine the role that each plays in implementing the
ADA's equal opportunity model.
1. The Reasonable Accommodation Provision
The legal obligation to adjust environments to accommodate disabled
individuals did not originate with the ADA. Since its passage, the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 has barred recipients of federal funds from
discriminating in their programs and activities against people with
disabilities.1 4 Although the Rehabilitation Act does not expressly codify
a right to reasonable accommodations, a series of implementing
regulations promulgated in the years following the Act's passage
specifically create a duty to accommodate people with disabilities. l"
Drawing from these regulations and from Rehabilitation Act case law,156
the United States Commission on Civil Rights in 1983 synthesized the
following definition of reasonable accommodation: "providing or
modifying devices, services, or facilities or changing practices or
procedures in order to match a particular person with a particular
154. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, as currently codified, states that "[n]o otherwise
qualified individual with a disability in the United States ... shall, solely by reason of her or his
disability, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to
discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." 29 U.S.C.
§ 794(a) (1994).
155. See, e.g., 41 FED. REG. 16,148 (1976) (codified at41 C.F.R. § 60-741.6(d) (2000)) (requiring
federal contractors to "make reasonable accommodation to the known physical and mental
limitations of an otherwise qualified applicant or employee with a disability" unless the
accommodation would impose an "undue hardship" on the contractors' business); 42 FED. REG.
22,676 (1977) (codified at 45 C.F.R. § 84.12(a) (2000)) (requiring recipients of federal funds to
make reasonable accommodations for their employees with known physical and mental
impairments).
156. See, e.g., Sch. Bd. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 287 n.17 (1987) (describing limits of
reasonableness with respect to reasonable accommodation requirement); Alexander v. Choate, 469
U.S. 287, 300 (1985) (" [W]hile a grantee need not be required to make fundamental or substantial
modifications to accommodate the handicapped, it may be required to make reasonable ones.")
(internal quotations omitted).
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program or activity."157 Significantly, the Commission noted that
"[i]ndividualizing opportunity is this definition's essence." ' Thus,
although in 1990 Title I of the ADA established the first explicit
statutory requirement to provide reasonable accommodations in the
workplace," 9  the general idea of achieving equality through
accommodation was not entirely new. The ADA's significant
contribution in this area has been to reaffirm and broaden the disability
accommodation rights implicit in the Rehabilitation Act 6' by defining
the accommodation duty in detail 161 and extending that duty to most
private employers.' 62
The ADA's detailed definition of the accommodation duty stems from
its statement that prohibited discrimination includes
(A) not making reasonable accommodations to the known physical
or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a
disability who is an applicant or employee, unless . . . the
accommodation would impose an undue hardship[ 63 ] on the
operation of the business of [the employer]; or
(B) denying employment opportunities to a job applicant or
employee who is an otherwise qualified individual with a disability,
if such denial is based on the need of [the employer] to make
157. UNrrED STATES COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, ACCOMMODATING THE SPECTRUM OF
INDIVIDUAL ABITITES 102 (1983).
158. Id.
159. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A)-(B) (1994).
160. See id. § 12201(a) (noting that unless specifically provided, nothing in the ADA "shall be
construed to apply a lesser standard than the standards applied under title V of the Rehabilitation
Act ... or the regulations issued by Federal agencies pursuant to such title").
161. See id. § 12112(b)(5). Robert Burgdorf, one of the Act's drafters, has noted that the
specificity of this and other provisions of the ADA reflects an "extreme example" of a trend toward
greater specificity in modem civil rights legislation. See Burgdorf, supra note 26, at 510. By
describing prohibited discrimination in great detail, the ADA insulates itself to a certain extent from
unduly restrictive regulatory and judicial interpretations. Id. at 509-10.
162. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A). The Rehabilitation Act applies only to federal agencies,
private employers with federal contracts, and recipients of federal funds. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 791, 793,
794(1994).
163. The ADA defines "undue hardship" as "an action requiring significant difficulty or expense"
when considered in light of factors such as the accommodation's cost, the overall financial resources
and size of the employer and of the specific facility at issue, and the type of business operations
involved. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10).
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reasonable accommodation to the physical or mental impairments
of the employee or applicant."6
A non-exhaustive list in Title I's definitions section notes that the
provision of "reasonable accommodations" may involve (1) making
existing facilities readily accessible to disabled employees; (2)
restructuring jobs; (3) modifying work schedules or allowing part-time
schedules; (3) reassigning a disabled employee to a vacant position; (4)
acquiring or modifying equipment or devices; (5) appropriately
modifying examinations, training materials, or policies; (6) providing
qualified interpreters or readers; or (7) making other similar
accommodations. 65 By describing the accommodation duty in such
detail, the statute recognizes that disability is not a monolithic concept
and that people with disabilities may need a wide variety of physical and
policy-related adjustments in order to function effectively in the
workplace. More fundamentally, these provisions recognize that without
such adjustments, the workplace is effectively a "hostile environment"
for disabled employees.
The ADA not only describes the duty of reasonable accommodation in
detail; it also extends that duty to employers not covered under the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973. The older statute covers only federal
agencies, private employers with federal contracts, and recipients of
federal funds. 66 The ADA extends this coverage to private employers
with fifteen or more employees. 6 Because this description of covered
employers was borrowed from Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 68 the
ADA brings the range of anti-discrimination protection afforded to
disabled employees in line with the range afforded to women and
minorities. This parity reflects Congress's recognition that disability
discrimination-which may sometimes take the form of failure to
accommodate-is a significant societal problem comparable to
differential treatment based on sex or race.
A few superficial similarities between the ADA's reasonable
accommodation provision and Title VII doctrine are also worth noting.
164. Id. at § 12112(b)(5).
165. See Id. § 12111(9). For a detailed discussion of each of these types of accommodation, see
BURGDORF, supra note 129, at 280-308.
166. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 791,793, and 794 (1994).
167. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111(2), (5) (1994). The ADA's coverage also extends to employment
agencies, labor organizations, and joint labor-management committees. Id. § 12111(2).
168. See id. § 2000e(b) (1994).
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First, Title VIl's disparate impact rule holds employers liable for
implementing facially-neutral policies-such as the use of a particular
test to screen job applicants-that disproportionately disadvantage
people of a particular race, sex, national origin, or religion.169 Like
reasonable accommodation, this doctrine removes artificial barriers to
employment7 ° and may penalize employers despite their having treated
all employees identically. Second, Title VIIs af-firmative action
remedy"' resembles reasonable accommodation in that it requires an
employer to take affirmative steps to provide a benefit or service to
some, but not all, employees.' 72 For this reason, one scholar has
described reasonable accommodation as "some form of affirmative
action," even though it might stray in some ways from traditional
affirmative action principles. 73
169. The Supreme Court first recognized the disparate impact theory of discrimination in Griggs
v. Duke Power, 401 U.S. 424 (1971). Later, the Civil Rights Act of 1991 explicitly codified this
theory with respect to Title VII. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (1994).
170. See Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431 (describing Court's newly-formulated disparate impact theory as
furthering Title VII's purpose of removing "artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to
employment'); Jeffrey 0. Cooper, Comment, Overcoming Barriers to Employment: The Meaning of
Reasonable Accommodation and Undue Hardship in the Americans with Disabilities Act, 139 U. PA.
L. REV. 1423, 1429 (1991) (comparing theories of reasonable accommodation and disparate impact
and noting that reasonable accommodation protects disabled people from "unnecessary barriers to
employment"). Indeed, in its broadest interpretation, disparate impact theory sounds an awful lot like
the reasonable accommodation requirement. In the context of race discrimination, one scholar has
argued that the courts have mistakenly viewed disparate impact theory as establishing "the right of a
nonwhite employee to play on an existing field," when instead they should view it as mandating
"alteration of the playing field itself in order to accommodate equally able players with diverse
playing styles." Flagg, supra note 138, at 2033.
171. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1) (1994) (allowing courts in Title VII cases to order "such
affirmative action as may be appropriate, which may include ... reinstatement or hiring of
employees"). For a detailed discussion of affirmative action issues, see LINDEMANN & GROSSMAN,
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW, 1033-202, 1741-73 (3d ed. 1996).
172. See, e.g., Richard K. Scotch, Models of Disability and the Americans with Disabilities Act,
21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 213, 222 (2000) (explaining that the "positive steps" that
affirmative action requires of employers are in some ways "analogous to the positive
accommodations needed to make employment... truly accessible to Americans with disabilities");
Pamela S. Karlan & George Rutherglen, Disabilities, Discrimination, and Reasonable
Accommodation, 46 DUKE UJ. 1, 14 (1996) ("Reasonable accommodation is affirmative action, in
the sense that it requires an employer to take account of an individual's disabilities and to provide
special treatment to him for that reason.").
173. See Tucker, supra note 26, at 345. Prof. Tucker recognizes the reasonable accommodation
duty as necessary and appropriate, given the ADA's underlying principle of recognizing "the
potential ofall members of society, disabled or not, even though it may cost money or impose some
burdens:' d at 351.
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Nevertheless, each of these two comparisons has its limits. First, with
respect to the reasonable accommodation-disparate impact comparison,
Title VI's disparate impact rule differs from the ADA's reasonable
accommodation requirement in that the disparate impact rule never
requires an employer to accord facially different treatment to similarly-
situated employees.174 Instead, under Title VII, an employer can avoid
liability by ceasing to implement a facially-neutral policy that
disproportionately disadvantages certain groups, and replacing it with a
new policy that is both facially and practically neutral1 75 Second, with
respect to the reasonable accommodation-affirmative action comparison,
reasonable accommodation alleviates current barriers confronting a
specific employee, while affirmative action seeks to remedy the
damaging effects of past intentional discrimination by granting all
current protected-group employees favorable treatment.
176
In addition, the reasonable accommodation provision allows a
disabled employee to benefit from a specific alteration to the workplace
that would have no value-or not as much value-to the employee's
nondisabled colleagues."V Affirmative action, on the other hand, can
174. See, e.g., Lanning v. S.E. Pa. Transp. Auth., 181 F.3d 478, 490 n.15 (3d Cir. 1999), cert.
denied, 528 U.S. 1131 (2000) (explaining that employer who used physical endurance test that
disadvantaged women could legally avoid liability by establishing different cut-off scores for men
and women, but that employer also had other options, such as tailoring test so that it measured only
physical abilities truly required by the job in question). Prof. Mark Kelman has argued that disparate
impact law bestows the right to "market-rational" treatment, meaning a right to be judged on one's
potential ability to perform a given job and nothing more. Market Discrimination and Groups, 53
STAN. L. REV. 833, 891 n.86 (2001). Reasonable accommodation, in contrast, grants a disabled
employee the right to avoid market-rational treatment, insofar as providing an accommodation
makes it more expensive for the employer to hire a disabled employee than a similarly qualified
nondisabled one.
175. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.3B (2000).
176. See Sheet Metal Workers Local 28 v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421, 482 (1986) (plurality opinion)
(holding that courts "may, in appropriate circumstances, order preferential relief benefitting
individuals who are not the actual victims of discrimination as a remedy for violations of Title VIr').
But see Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (holding that strict scrutiny
standard applies to review of race-based voluntary affirmative action programs). Adarand dealt only
with voluntary affirmative action rather than the type of court-ordered program at issue in Sheet
Metal Workers. It currently "remains unclear how Adarand will be applied, if at all, to race-based
court-ordered affirmative relief." LINDEMANN & GROSSMAN, supra note 171, at 979 (Cum. Supp.
2000, Philip J. Pfeiffer ed.).
177. Indeed, many accommodations do not even put a disabled employee on par with nondisabled
colleagues. Prof. Bonnie Tucker, who is deaf, has explained that her use of a TDD and relay service
to communicate via telephone with others who do not have a TDD is more cumbersome, less
effective, and much less private than the use of regular telephone service. See Tucker, supra note 26,
at 346-47.
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allow a covered employee to receive a job benefit, such as a
promotion,17 that his or her colleagues would find equally valuable. In
the end, whether the ADA's reasonable accommodation provision
represents a subcategory of affirmative action legislation or a different
animal altogether, it departs starkly from the formal equality model and
necessitates an expanded understanding of civil fights and equal
opportunity.
2. The Protected Class Provision
Another feature of the ADA's codification of the equal opportunity
principle is its protected class 'provision, which defines the type of
"disability" one must possess in order to enjoy the fights that the statute
affords. Both Title I of the ADA and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act protect only an "individual with a disability" from discrimination. 79
Because the ADA borrowed its "disability" definition from the
Rehabilitation Act Amendment of 1974,8' both statutes currently define
"disability" in terms of the same three alternative prongs:
(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or
more of the major life activities of [the person in question];
(B) a record of such an impairment; or
(C) being regarded as having such an impairment."8
Before the 1974 amendment, the Rehabilitation Act defined disability
only in terms of a person's employment-limiting impairment and his or
her potential to benefit from vocational rehabilitation services, because
the Act's primary recognized purpose at that time was to regulate the
173. See, e.g., United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 163, 185-86 (1987) (plurality opinion)
(upholding order requiring Alabama Department of Public Safety temporarily to promote one
African-American trooper for every white trooper promoted where Department had engaged in long-
term pervasive discrimination).
179. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (1994) (ADA); 29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(b) (1994) (Rehabilitation Act).
180. See Chai R. Feldblum, Definition of Disability Under Federal Anti-Discrimination Law:
What Happened? Why? And What Can IVe Do About It?, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 91, 127-
29 (2000) (discussing the ADA drafters' decision to rely upon the Rehabilitation Act's definition of
disability).
181. The precise wording reproduced here is from the ADA. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2). Because the
Rehabilitation Act, as a stylistic matter, defines "an individual with a disability" rather than
"disability," it prefaces the three prongs with "a person who" and adds the words "has," "has," and
"is to the beginning of each prong, respectively. See 29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(B).
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provision of such services."'2 Congress added the thee-pronged definition
as a supplement in 1974, after recognizing that the first "disability"
definition did not suit the Act's additional purpose of combatting
discrimination.1 83 With respect to the ADA, the statute's drafters ideally
would have created yet a third, more expansive, definition turning solely
on actual, recorded, or perceived impairment." However, it was much
more politically expedient to rely upon the Rehabilitation Act's familiar
three-pronged definition, which by that time had been serving its purpose
reasonably well for many years.
185
The flexibility of the ADA's three-pronged definition, particularly as
manifested in its "regarded as" prong, reflects Congressional recognition
of disability as a social construct. Indeed, the U.S. Supreme Court has
noted that by including the "regarded as" prong in the Rehabilitation Act,
"Congress acknowledged that society's accumulated myths and fears
about disability and disease are as handicapping as are the physical
limitations that flow from actual impairment."'8 6 This observation is
consistent with the explicit Congressional finding in the ADA that
discrimination against people with disabilities can result from
"stereotypic assumptions not truly indicative of the individual ability of
such individuals to participate in, and contribute to, society."' 87
In addition, by limiting coverage to a specific group, the ADA's
"disability" definition implements a principle of "anti-subordination," '88
182. See Pub. L. No. 93-112, § 7(6), 87 Stat. 361 (1973). This definition remains a part of the
Rehabilitation Act and continues to define eligibility criteria for the receipt of vocational
rehabilitation services. See 29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(A).
183. See Feldblum, supra note 180, at 103.
184. See Lisa Eichhom, Major Litigation Activities Regarding Major Life Activities: The Failure
of the "Disability" Definition in the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 77 N.C. L REV. 1405,
1468-77 (1999) (arguing that the "major life activities" and "substantially limits" terminology in the
definition has invited courts to interpret "disability" much too narrowly and advocating an
amendment substituting a simpler impairment-based definition); Berg, supra note 134, at 50 n.254
(noting that a simpler impairment-based definition would "significantly enhance[]"the ADA's
capacity to remedy disability-based bias). See generally Feldblum, supra note 180 (describing wide
gap between drafters' and courts' understandings of ADA's disability definition, and advocating
amendment to replace current definition with impairment-based definition).
185. "Making radical change is not ordinarily Congress' forte. Indeed, one of the best 'selling
points' of the ADA was that Congress would simply be extending to the private sector the
requirements of an existing law." Feldblum, supra note 180, at 92.
186. Sch. Bd. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273,284 (1987).
187. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7) (1994) (from the ADA's "Findings and purpose" section).
188. See Ruth Colker, Anti-Subordination Above All: Sex, Race, and Equal Protection, 61 N.Y.U.
L. REv. 1003, 1007 (1986) (explaining "anti-subordination" principle, which "seeks to eliminate the
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which coincides with the statute's equal opportunity model. The anti-
subordination principle focuses not upon whether members of different
categories are being treated equally, but instead upon whether members
of some specific, historically-subordinated category are being placed at a
practical disadvantage. Title VII, on the other hand, implements a
principle of "anti-differentiation" ' 9 because it protects any person from
receiving different and disadvantageous treatment because of race, sex,
national origin, or religion. 90 The anti-differentiation pr-inciple, of
course, coincides with the formal equality model that informs Title VII
and most other anti-discrimination statutes.
A decided shortcoming of the anti-differentiation principle is its
tendency to spur discrimination actions by members of historically
favored groups, causing case law to stray from the original statutory
purpose of protecting disadvantaged classes of people. 9' The ADA's
protected class provision expressly precludes this kind of mission drift by
limiting the act's coverage to disabled people, whom the ADA refers to
as "a discrete and insular minority."'192
Unfortunately, by restricting membership in this protected minority
group to those with current, past, or perceived "substantial[]
limit[ations]" on "major life activities,' 93  the ADA's "disability"
definition has allowed the judiciary to limit the statute's coverage
dramatically. Numerous courts have seized upon the opportunity to
interpret the definition's key language very narrowly,' 9 and while such
power disparities between men and women, and between whites and non-whites, through the
development of laws and policies that directly redress those disparities").
189. See id. at 1005-06 (describing the anti-differentiation principle). Prof. Colker notes that
disparate impact theory has allowed Title VII doctrine to depart occasionally from strict anti-
differentiation principles in a way that Equal Protection doctrine thus far has not. See id. at 1017-
1019. Nevertheless, anti-differentiation has played a very significant role in guiding Title VII's
different treatment doctrine, for better or worse. See supra notes 35-43 and accompanying text.
190. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
191. See Colker, supra note 188, at 1012 (arguing that the anti-differentiation principle "does a
disservice" to the true history and purpose of the Equal Protection Clause "by asserting that
discrimination against whites is as problematic as discrimination against blacks"); Tucker, supra
note 26, at 363 (discussing historic purpose of Civil Rights Act of 1964).
192. 42 U.S.C. §12101(a)C7) (1994).
193. See supra note 181 and accompanying text.
194. See, e.g., Ellison v. Software Spectrum, 85 F.3d 187, 193 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding that
plaintiff vth breast cancer did not have a disability because she had never been substantially limited
in working and had never been regarded as being so limited); Kelly v. Drexel Univ., 94 F.3d 102,
106 (3d Cir. 1996) (holding that plaintiff with degenerative joint disease, which affected his walking,
was not disabled because limitation on walking was not substantial).
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interpretations have been roundly criticized for years, 195 the Supreme
Court has recently narrowed the ADA's disability definition even
further. 196 Indeed, several scholars have posited that by severely
restricting the scope of the ADA's protected class in this manner, courts
are indirectly rejecting the statute's equal opportunity model, which they
view as granting "special" entitlements to a preferred group.
197
Ironically, this view of the ADA's equal opportunity model may stem
in part from the very existence of the protected class provision. These
types of provisions typically appear in entitlement legislation such as
public benefits laws, which define special classes of people for eligibility
purposes.'9 The resulting structural resemblance between the ADA and
public benefits laws is potentially dangerous insofar as it causes
195. See generally Lisa Eichhorn, Applying the ADA to Mitigating Measures Cases: A Choice of
Statutory Evils, 31 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1071 (1999); Burgdorf, supra note 148; Arlene B. Mayerson,
Restoring Regard for the "Regarded As" Prong: Giving Effect to Congressional Intent, 42 VILL. L
REV. 587 (1997); Steven S. Locke, The Incredible Shrinking Protected Class: Redefining the Scope
of Disability Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 68 U. COLO. L REV. 107 (1997). See also
Diller, supra note 26, at 25-30 (criticizing narrow interpretations of "disability" as contrary to
Congressional intent and EEOC guidance); Eichhorn, supra note 184, at 1434-68 (reviewing and
criticizing federal decisions interpreting the "major life activities" and "substantially limits"
elements); Ruth Colker, Hypercapitalism Affirmative Protection for People with Disabilities,
Illness, and Parenting Responsibilities Under United States Law, 9 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM. 213,
229-33 (1997) (describing courts' restrictive interpretations of "disability" as a strategy used to limit
ADA's potential to bring about equality through affirmative conduct).
196. See, e.g., Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., 527 U.S. 516, 521, 525 (1999) (holding that Court
of Appeals correctly considered remedial effects of plaintiffs hypertension medication in
concluding that plaintiff was not substantially limited and thus not disabled, and that employer who
dismissed plaintiff because of hypertension had not regarded him as disabled).
197. See, e.g., Diller, supra note 26, at 23 (arguing that narrow interpretations of the ADA reflect
the courts' misunderstanding or rejection of the statute as a guarantor of civil rights); Tucker, supra
note 26, at 353 (stating that narrow interpretations of the ADA's "disability" definition "are probably
the result of the courts' reluctance to impose what they view as widespread affirmative action
responsibilities on specific entities").
198. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 416(i) (1994) (defining "disability" as eligibility criterion for receipt of
certain Social Security benefits). Indeed, the ADA may never have included a protected class
definition at all had it not drawn upon the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, whose original disability
definition provides criteria that govern entitlement to rehabilitation services. See supra notes 182-83
and accompanying text. Congress had to add the second, three-pronged, definition to the
Rehabilitation Act only because the original "entitlement" definition did not mesh with the Act's
new anti-discrimination provision in Section 504. See supra note 183 and accompanying text. When
the ADA drafters made the political decision to model the new statute on the Rehabilitation Act,
they borrowed the Act's three-pronged definition. See Feldblum, supra note 180, at 128-29
(discussing decisionmaking in the drafting of the ADA). In hindsight, however, because the ADA
(unlike the Rehabilitation Act) does not contain any entitlement provisions, Title I could have simply
prohibited discrimination on the basis of disability (or physical or mental impairment), and skipped
the protected class provision altogether.
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confusion as to whether the ADA is granting "special" benefits rather
than civil rights. Indeed, one scholar has gone so far as to argue that the
disability definition "returns individuals with disabilities to their
traditional role within the biomedical model of establishing entitlement
to benefits through the evocation of sympathy and pity." ' 9 In sum, while
the ADA's protected class provision properly focuses the statute
exclusively on the historically subordinated group of people with
disabilities, it has also had the unfortunate side effect of hindering the
recognition of the statute as a civil rights law. Such recognition is critical
to the ADA's ability to implement its underlying equal opportunity
model.
III. FORMAL EQUALITY MEETS EQUAL OPPORTUNITY:
HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT CLAIMS IN THE ADA CONTEXT
Although the Rehabilitation Act has been guaranteeing certain rights
against disability discrimination in the workplace for decades, and the
ADA recently celebrated its tenth anniversary, the appearance of hostile
environment harassment claims under these statutes is a fairly recent
phenomenon. In 1985, fourteen years after the Fifth Circuit had first
recognized a Title VII hostile environment claim in Rogers but a year
before the Supreme Court did so in Meritor, one Rehabilitation Act
plaintiff relied on the common law theory of intentional infliction of
emotional distress in seeking compensation for injuries allegedly
resulting from disability-based harassment.200
Six years after Meritor, another plaintiff relied on both hostile
environment and constructive discharge theories to support her claim
under the Rehabilitation Act.20' The claim, which reached the Sixth
Circuit on appeal after summary judgment, arose from the reactions of
the plaintiffs supervisor upon learning that the plaintiff, a teacher, had
199. Berg, supra note 134, at 42.
200. See generally Graves v. Methodist Youth Servs., 624 F. Supp. 429 (N.D. I1. 1985). The
plaintiff's emotional distress claim in Graves stemmed from allegations that, before his termination,
his supervisors and co-workers "verbally harassed" him about his mental disability. Id. at 429. The
United States District Court for the Northern District of Dlinois overruled a jurisdictional challenge
to the plaintiff's wrongful termination claim under the Rehabilitation Act and, in so doing, held that
it had jurisdiction over the common law harassment claim under the theory of pendent jurisdiction.
Id. at 434.
201. See Pendleton v. Jefferson Local Sch. Dist. Bd. of Ed., No. 91-3126, 1992 WL 57421, at *5
(6th Cir. Mar. 25, 1992) (unpublished decision) (table decision at 958 F.2d 372).
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multiple sclerosis.02 The supervisor had called both the plaintiff's doctor
and her husband without her permission to inquire about her disease and
treatment.23 He then allegedly told the plaintiff that she had "a psychosis
caused by her medicine" and called her daily to inquire about her plans
for future teaching." 4 After the plaintiffs doctor recommended that she
apply for disability leave, she did so and never returned to her job.05
The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio
granted summary judgment on the Rehabilitation Act claim on the
ground that the plaintiff had never been terminated.2 6 The Sixth Circuit
reversed, holding that Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, like Title
VII, allows disability discrimination cases to be brought "not only for
'termination' but for 'exclusion from employment."' 7 Because the
plaintiff had never actually been terminated, it determined that hers was
"an 'exclusion from employment' case. ' 2°8 Failure to recognize an
"exclusion from employment" theory, the court reasoned, "would have
the restrictive result of making an employer who fires an employee
because of a handicap liable, while leaving untouched an employer who
harasses... a handicapped individual, [causing] further deterioration of
a person's physical condition to the point where she can no longer
work." ' 9 A year later, citing Meitor, the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania stated in dicta that "it is strongly
arguable ... that disability-based harassment responsible for creating an
abusive working environment is itself actionable under the Rehabilitation
Act, even if it is not accompanied by termination from the job in
question. '21°
The United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia
reached a similar conclusion under the ADA in Haysman v. Food Lion,
Inc., holding that even if the plaintiff in that case "failed to prove
202. Id. at *1-*2.
203. Id. at *I.
204. Id. at *2.
205. Id.
206. Id. at *4.
207. Id. at *6. The court noted that "this circuit and several others have applied Title VII theories
in deciding [Section 504] cases." Il at *4.
208. Id. at *4. The "exclusion" language does not appear in the statute. Instead, the Pendleton
court borrowed it from an earlier Ninth Circuit Section 504 case. See id. at *4 (citing Smith v.
Barton, 914 F.2d 1330, 1338-39 (9th Cir. 1990)).
209. Id. at *4.
210. Taylor v. Garrett, 820 F. Supp. 933, 939 n.11 (1993).
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constructive discharge, he could still possibly recover on [a] hostile
environment theory."' The court explained that an ADA plaintiff "does
not have to show 'tangible' or 'economic' loss if a jury finds that the
harassment was so severe as to subject him to disparate treatment with
respect to the terms or conditions of employment. 21 2 The plaintiff in
Haysman suffered from emotional disorders and a disability that affected
his back and knee.213 He presented evidence indicating that, after learning
of his medical restrictions, his supervisors scheduled him for the least
desirable shifts, berated him in front of co-workers, told him to continue
working despite his doctor's advice, and punched or kicked the injured
parts of his body.2 4 The court held that from this evidence, "a reasonable
jury could find that Haysman was subjected to negative stereotyping,
threats, verbal abuse and other conduct which created an intimidating
and hostile environment."2 5
At this point, many federal circuit and district courts have assumed in
dicta that hostile environment harassment, in and of itself, is actionable
under the ADA, based on the similarity of the ADA's "terms, conditions,
and privileges" language to the Title VII language that first gave rise to
hostile environment actions in Rogers and Meitor.2 '6 Indeed, when the
Fourth Circuit in 2001expressly recognized such a claim under the ADA,
its opinion noted that no court examining the issue had ever held or
assumed otherwise.2"7 Therefore, it is all but settled nationally that one
211. 893 F. Supp. 1092, 1110 (1995). See also Davis v. York Int'l, Inc., Civ. A. No. HAR 92-
3545, 1993 WL 524761, *9 (D. Md. Nov. 22, 1993) (holding that employee who had not left her job
could proceed against her employer on a hostile environment theory under the ADA).
212. Haysman v. FoodLion, Inc., 893 F. Supp. 1092, 1110 (S.D. Ga. 1995).
213. Id. at 1097.
214. Id. at 1108.
215. Id.
216. See generally, e.g., Vollmert v. Wis. Dep't of Transp., 197 F.3d 293, 297 (7th Cir. 1999);
Cannice v. Norwest Bank, 189 F.3d 723 (8th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1019 (2000); Walton
v. Mental Health Ass'n, 168 F.3d 661, 666-67 (3d Cir. 1999); Rodriguez v. Loctite P.R., Inc., 967 F.
Supp. 653, 663 (D.P.R. 1997); Morgan v. City & County of San Francisco, No. C-96-3573-VRV,
1998 WL 30013, *7 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 13, 1998); Hudson v. Loretex Corp., No. 95-CV-844
(RSP/RWS), 1997 WL 159282, *3 (N.D.N.Y. April 2, 1997). Curiously, my research also revealed
one case, from the Sixth Circuit, that treated a plaintiff's disability-based hostile environment claim
as separate and distinct from his ADA claim. See Poe v. Memphis light, Gas and Water Div., No.
98-5942, 1999 WL 1204694, *3 (6th Cir. Nov. 30, 1999) (table decision at 201 F.3d 441).
217. Fox v. Gen. Motors Corp., 247 F.3d 169, 175 (4th Cir. 2001). See also Flowers v. S. Reg'l
Physician Servs., Inc., 247 F.3d 232, 233, 233 n.3 (5th Cir. 2001) (noting that the Sixth Circuit had
implicitly recognized a hostile environment claim under the ADA and that all other federal appellate
courts addressing the issue had assumed the existence of such a claim).
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may sue for disability-based harassment under the ADA, and courts are
likely to hear more claims of this type from now on.
As they do so, courts will need to resist a temptation to turn
unthinkingly to Title VII doctrine when hostile environment questions
arise under the ADA. 1 8 As Parts II and III of this Article have explained,
Title VII and the ADA arise from very different underlying assumptions
about discrimination and the nature of equality, even if they share
statutory language giving rise to hostile environment claims. Therefore,
copying and pasting Title VII doctrine into ADA opinions, absent an in-
depth comparison of the structures, purposes, and goals of the two
statutes, would very likely deny justice to ADA litigants.
The Subparts below identify new issues arising under the ADA with
respect to each of the four elements of a traditional hostile environment
claim: severe and pervasive harassment creating hostile or abusive
working environment; plaintiff's reasonable perception of hostility or
abuse; causal connection between the harassment and a protected
characteristic; and employer responsibility for the harassment. However,
before Subparts B through E analyze these four traditional elements,
Section A examines an additional element, membership in a protected
class, that has resurrected itself in the context of disability-based hostile
environment harassment. In examining these respective elements, all of
the Subparts propose methods of analysis that coincide with the anti-
discrimination goal and equal opportunity model underlying the ADA.
218. Some courts have already made sweeping statements about the applicability of Title VII
standards to ADA hostile environment claims. See, e.g., Fritz v. Mascotech Automotive Servs., 914
F. Supp. 1481, 1492 n.6 (E.D. Mich. 1996) (noting that "standards developed under Title VII case
law govern such claims"); McClain v. S.W. Steel Co., 940 F. Supp. 295, 301 (N.D. Okla. 1996)
(stating that "Congress intended for hostile work environment claims under the ADA to be governed
by the same standard as that applied to similar claims under Title VII"). The Third Circuit, in
describing the relationship between Title VII and the ADA in a disability harassment case, has
glossed over the fact that Title VII has no coverage restrictions, while the ADA covers only a
specific protected class. See Walton v. Mental Health Ass'n, 168 F.3d 661, 666 (3d Cir. 1999)
(stating that the ADA and Title VII both prohibit "discrimination in employment against members of
certain classes").
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A. Membership in a Protected Class: Is Harassment "Substantially
Limiting"?
To the extent that a few circuits still list "membership in a protected
class" among the elements of a Title VII hostile environment claim,219
that element exists as a requirement in name only, given Title VII's
applicability to all races, sexes, national origins, and religions.22 Under
the ADA this element takes on a life of its own and can lead to summary
judgment against a plaintiff who fails to produce evidence showing that
he or she has a statutorily-defined "disability."2 21 This scenario has
already played itself out in more than one ADA hostile environment
action.'
For example in EEOC v. General Electric Co..' the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Indiana held that plaintiff
James Smith had not been regarded as disabled despite the fact that he
had experienced workplace harassment amidst office rumors that he was
HIV-positive. 4 The rumors began to circulate before Smith, who was
gay, returned to work following hospitalization to repair an esophageal
tear.Y2 Smith was emaciated upon his return, and the rumors became
more widespread.& ' According to Smith's allegations, he began to
experience escalating incidents of harassment around that time, including
219. See, e.g., Cain v. Blackwell, 246 F.3d 758, 760 (5th Cir. 2001); Wanchik v. Great Lakes
Health Plan, Inc., No. 99-2333, 2001 WL 223724, *7 (6th Cir. Mar. 2, 2001) (table decision at 248
F.3d 1154).
220. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
221. See, e.g., Ellison v. Software Spectmrn, 85 F.3d 187 (5th Cir. 1996) (affirming summary
judgment for the defendant on the ground that plaintiff's breast cancer was not a disability for
purposes of the ADA); Kelly v. Drexel Univ., 94 F.3d 102, 109 (3d Cir. 1996) (affirming summary
judgment for the defendant on the ground that plaintiff's degenerative joint disease was not a
disability for purposes of the ADA).
222. See, e.g., Thurston v. Henderson, Docket No. 99-40-P-H, 2000 WL 761897, at *8 (D. Me.
Jan. 5, 2000) (recommending that summary judgment be granted to defendant on hostile
environment claim on ground that plaintiff, who was on medication for post-traumatic stress
disorder, was not disabled); EEOC v. Gen. Elec. Co., 17 F. Supp. 2d 824 (N.D. Ind. 1998) (granting
summary judgment to defendant on hostile environment claim on grounds that plaintiff, who was
rumored to be HIV-positive, was neither disabled nor regarded as disabled).
223. 17 F. Supp. 2d 824 (N.D. Ind. 1998).
224. Id. at 83 1.
225. Id. at 832.
226. Id. at 827, 832.
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having a container of enamel dropped on him, which sent him to the
hospital for one night.227
Smith filed suit against his employer, General Electric, alleging
hostile environment harassment under the ADA. Because he was not in
fact HIV-positive, he based his protected class argument on the third
prong of the ADA's disability definition, which covers individuals who
have been "regarded as" disabled.22 However, despite Smith's evidence
of the workplace rumors, the court held as a matter of law that he had
never been regarded as having an impairment that "substantially limited"
a "major life activity" and thus was outside the ADA's protected class of
individuals with disabilities. 9 The court therefore granted summary
judgment on the harassment claim to the defendant.no
The court reasoned that because the ADA defines disability as an
impairment that "substantially limits a major life activity," a plaintiff
who asserts that he has been regarded as disabled must produce specific
evidence that his employer has viewed him as being substantially limited
in some particular major life activity." Smith's supervisors and co-
workers believed him to have asymptomatic HIV, so he could produce
no such evidence. 2 He therefore lost his opportunity to make any
showings regarding the harassment he allegedly experienced and its
connection to the rumors of his HIV-positive status.
As General Electric demonstrates, the already significant problems
inherent in narrow readings of the ADA's "regarded as" prong 3 become
even more insidious in the context of hostile environment claims.
According to his allegations, Smith's rumored HIV-positive status was
sufficient to inspire violent harassment that eventually drove him from
his job, 4 yet it was insufficient to invoke the protections of a statute
designed in part to end workplace segregation based on real and
227. Id. at 827.
228. Id. at 828.
229. Id. at 831.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 828.
232. d at831.
233. For an excellent detailed discussion of these problems, see Arlene B. Mayerson, Restoring
Regard for the Regarded As Prong: Giving Effect to Congressional Intent, 42 VILL L. REV. 587
(1997).
234. Smith's complaint alleged that he left his job in 1994 as a result of the harassment. See
General Elec., 17 F. Supp. 2d at 827.
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perceived disabilities. 5 While the U.S. Supreme Court, in its 1998
Bragdon v. Abbott decision, 1 6 may have prevented repetition of the
specific outcome in Smith's case by holding that a plaintiff with
asymptomatic HIV was substantially limited in reproduction and thus
disabled,237 the Court has done nothing to eliminate the General Electric
court's overall strategy of applying a narrow, literal reading of the
"regarded as" prong to harassment cases. Thus, one can easily envision
future plaintiffs suffering harassment due to stigmatized but not-always-
limiting impairments, such as epilepsy or disfiguring skin diseases, yet
being unable to seek reparations in the courts for the same reason Smith
was unable to do so. Indeed, now that the U.S. Supreme Court has held
that a person is not disabled if he or she can alleviate the effects of an
impairment through mitigating measures such as medication, 38 plaintiffs
with controlled but very stigmatizing impairments such as mental illness
can suffer the same fate if they turn to the courts to seek redress for
disability-based harassment.
This scenario has in fact already played itself out in Thurston v.
Henderson," a decision of the United States District Court for the
District of Maine. The plaintiff in that case, Michael Thurston, had been
diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder2 but was controlling many
of its effects through medication.24' His co-workers knew of his mental
illness and called him "a 'child' who 'needed help.' 242 One co-worker
said, in the presence of Thurston and others, that Thurston was "on
suicide watch."2 43 Another co-worker submitted a falsified grievance,
purportedly filed by Thurston, making it look as if Thurston was seeking
special preferences in work assignments. 244 Yet despite Thurston's
235. One of the first Congressional Findings appearing in the ADA concerns the fact that "society
has tended to isolate and segregate individuals with disabilities" 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (1994).
236. 524 U.S. 624 (1998).
237. Id. at 641.
238. Sutton v. United Air Lines, 527 U.S. 471,482-83 (1999).
239. Docket No. 99-40-P-H, 2000 WL 761897 (D. Me. Jan. 5,2000).
240. Id. at *1.
241. Id. at *4.
242. Id. at *5.
243. Id. at *6.
244. Id. at *5. This act of fraud plays upon disability theorist Lennard Davis's notion that people
with disabilities are "regarded as narcissists" who demand "exceptions for themselves that overstep
what employers can or should provide." Bending Over Backwards: Disability, Narcissism, and the
Law, 21 BERKELY J. EMP. &LAB. L 193, 197 (2000).
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acknowledged diagnosis and these instances of harassment, a federal
magistrate recommended that summary judgment be granted to the
defendant because this evidence failed to show that he was
"substantially" limited "in a major life activity" at the time the
harassment took place.245 The court did not discuss the "regarded as"
prong, presumably because the submitted evidence did not indicate that
Thurston's supervisor or co-workers knew of any specific major life
activity that his mental illness substantially limited, although they all
knew of the illness itself.
The literal interpretations in both General Electric and Thurston
undercut the ADA's purpose of facilitating the integration of people with
disabilities into the workplace. To avoid this result, courts analyzing the
"disability" definition in ADA hostile environment cases must do so with
an understanding of the nature of disability-based harassment. This type
of harassment typically stems from stigma associated with an impairment
rather than from beliefs regarding the specific limitations that the
impairment may impose. 46 Thus, because stigma normally has nothing
to do with one's functional limitations, an overly literal reading of the
ADA's definition of "disability," which turns on whether one has or is
believed to have a "substantially limiting" impairment, misses the point:
While assessing the effect of an impairment upon whether an
individual can perform certain life activities may be appropriate in
certain contexts, it sheds no light whatsoever on whether a person
possesses---or has been perceived to possess-a physical or mental
difference that may have caused him or her to be subjected to social
stigma and injustice. 7
Therefore, if an ADA harassment plaintiff is able to prove an
impairment but does not qualify as having an actual disability under the
245. 2000 WL 761897 at *8.
246. Indeed, Professor Adrienne Asch has reviewed research indicating that because people with
disabilities are supposed to play a social role involving dependency and neediness, they are "more
disliked by nondisabled others if they are clearly competent than if they are perceived as
incompetent at a task." Critical Race Theory, Feminism, and Disability: Reflections on Social
Justice and Personal Identity, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 391, 395 (2001) (citing Irwin Katz et al., Attitudinal
Ambivalence and Behavior Toward People with Disabilities, in ATrITUDES TOWARD PERSONS WrrH
DISABILrrIES 47, 53 (Harold E. Yuker ed., 1988)). See also S. REP. NO. 116, 101st Cong., 1st Sess.
23-24 (1989) (stating that the "regarded as" prong of the ADA's disability definition "is particularly
important for individuals with stigmatic conditions that are viewed as physical impairments but do
not in fact result in a substantial limitation of a major life activity").
247. Berg, supra note 134, at 50.
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first prong of the statutory definition, the courts should follow the
EEOC's regulations by interpreting the "regarded as" prong to include a
person who "[has a physical or mental impairment that substantially
limits major life activities only as a result of the attitudes of others"
toward the impairment. 48 Consequently, such a plaintiff would satisfy
the prima facie burden of showing a disability: because of the alleged
harassment, the plaintiffs impairment substantially limited him in
working as a result of the attitudes of others. If the plaintiff is later put to
his proof, he should be able to avoid summary judgment on the protected
class issue if he comes forward with evidence indicating that
impairment-based harassment in fact occurred.249
If an ADA harassment plaintiff-like Smith-does not have an
impairment but instead is merely regarded as having an impairment,
similar tests should apply: the plaintiff can satisfy his prima facie
"protected class" burden by alleging harassment based upon the
perceived impairment, and the plaintiff can survive a summary judgment
motion on this element if he can offer evidence that harassment based on
the perceived impairment indeed took place. The fact that the impairment
in question was perceived rather than actual should not alter the basic
analysis. As the U.S. Supreme Court has observed, by including the
"regarded as" prong in the disability definition, "Congress acknowledged
that society's accumulated myths and fears about disability and diseases
are as handicapping as are the limitations that flow from actual
impairment. '
'25
Finally, even when an ADA plaintiffs impairment and its limitations
are actual rather than perceived, the plaintiff will have difficulty proving
membership in the protected class if the only major life activity limited
by the impairment is working. In a non-harassment case, the United
States Supreme Court has held that an ADA plaintiff cannot prove a
substantial limitation in working merely by showing that her impairment
substantially limits her ability to perform her particular job.25' Instead, a
plaintiff must prove that the impairment forecloses generally the type of
248. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(l)(2) (2001).
249. Because harassment short of outright abuse could substantially limit an employee in
working, the degree of harassment shown with respect to the "protected class" element might differ
from the degree required under the "severe and pervasive" element, which calls for evidence of an
"abusive workplace environment." See supra notes 78-81 and accompanying text.
250. Sch. Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 284 (1987) (interpreting Rehabilitation
Act's disability definition, whose relevant language is identical to that in the ADA's definition).
251. Sutton v. United Air Lines, 527 U.S. 471,492 (1999).
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employment in which she is engaged.252 To meet this burden, a plaintiff
must demonstrate that she would encounter disability-related obstacles
across an entire class of jobs or a broad range of jobs.23 In an ADA
hostile environment case, this requirement becomes absurd because the
obstacle at issue is the employer's harassing conduct. It would be
impossible to produce evidence that similar harassment would occur at
other workplaces, as no employer would admit to such a possibility. In
addition, such a requirement would wrongly presume that harassment is
not a significant barrier to employment unless it is practiced by the great
majority of employers in a given field.
B. Severe and Pervasive Harassment: What Constitutes a Hostile
Environment Within an Already-Hostile World?
The ADA's equal opportunity model assumes that the world is
always, already, a hostile environment for people with disabilities
because it is fraught with socially-constructed obstacles." In the
employment context, a workplace environment that a nondisabled
employee experiences as appropriate could be harsh or even abusive to a
disabled one. For example, a workplace in which employees are not
allowed to eat or drink while at their stations could spell disaster for an
employee with hypoglycemia, who may need sugary food or drinks at
hand to avoid passing out. For this reason, the element of an ADA hostile
environment claim requiring "severe and pervasive" harassment merits
particularly careful analysis; in many cases, this element may require
courts to identify hostile or abusive environments within a superficially
neutral atmosphere. Further, because the hostile environment claim
originated in the context of Title VII's formal equality model, while
reasonable accommodation requirements flow from the ADA's equal
opportunity model, courts might overlook reasonable accommodation
252. Id. See also Forrisi v. Bowen, 794 F.2d 931, 935 (4th Cir. 1986) (interpreting identical
language in the Rehabilitation Act's "disability" definition). The Forrisi court held that the plaintiff,
who repaired utility systems, did not have an actual disability because his acrophobia did not
substantially limit him in working, given that he could perform other jobs that did not require
climbing. d In addition, the court held that the plaintiffs employer had not regarded him as
disabled because it had viewed him "as unsuited for one position in one plant-and nothing more."
Id.
253. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 491 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.20)(3)(i) (1998)).
254. See supra notes 147-53 and accompanying text.
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issues when assessing the severity and pervasiveness of hostile
environment harassment.
Because a single failure to provide reasonable accommodation already
violates the ADA, it cannot automatically lead to harassment liability as
well. Nevertheless, in an ADA case alleging both harassment and failure
to accommodate,255 the circumstances surrounding the refusal of
accommodations-and the refusal itself-should certainly be part of the
mix of facts that a court considers when deciding whether the harassment
was severe and pervasive so as to create a hostile or abusive
environment. For example, if an employee experienced several incidents
of disability-based taunting or segregation over a period of eighteen
months, those incidents alone may not rise to the level of creating a
"hostile" or "abusive" work environment, even if the employer made no
attempt to put an end to the offensive conduct. However, if the employee
also requested several different reasonable accommodations over the
same period, and the employer met each request only after an
unreasonable delay, a reasonable person might conclude that the
workplace was in fact characterized by hostility toward the employee
because of his disability. Were the court to "disaggregate" the
evidence 6 and refuse to consider the delays as part of the proof of
harassment, it could strike the harassment claim as a matter of law at the
outset, depriving the factfinder of the opportunity to evaluate the
employer's acts and omissions in full context. This type of analysis
would preclude consideration of whether a pattern of hostility existed,
though that may well have been the case.
And this preclusion is not without consequence. If the taunting and
segregation, viewed in light of the repeated delays regarding
accommodations, would convince a factfmder that the workplace was
indeed imbued with an anti-disability animus, then the employee could
recover not only backpay for time lost due to inadequate
accommodation, but also compensatory damages for any physical or
255. Harassment and reasonable accommodation problems often go hand in hand. See generally
Silk v. City of Chicago, 194 F.3d 788 (7th Cir. 1999) (analyzing alleged harassment of police officer
after his receipt of accommodation in the form of permission to work only days shifts); Hudson v.
Loretex, No. 95-CV-844 (RSP/RWS), 1997 WL 159282 (N.D.N.Y. April 2, 1997) (analyzing
alleged harassment of machine worker after receipt of similar accommodation); Haysman v. Food
Lion, Inc., 893 F. Supp. 1092 (S.D. Ga. 1995) (analyzing alleged harassment of grocery worker
following his receipt of some accommodations and request for others).
256. See Schultz, supra note 90, at 1720-29 (discussing courts' "disaggregation" of evidence in
sex-based harassment claims).
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emotional injuries resulting from the hostile environment. 7 However, if
evidence of taunting and segregation is never considered, the employee
may receive backpay for the accommodation delays, but any other
injuries would likely go unrecognized; the nature of the defendant's
conduct is usually relevant to the availability of compensatory
damages,25 and some occasional delays in accommodation look much
less injurious than an eighteen-month-long pattern of hostility.
C. Reasonable Perception of a Hostile and Abusive Environment: Is
Reasonableness, Like Disability, Socially Constructed?
According to equal opportunity theory, the status quo appears
reasonable to nondisabled people because it was created by them to suit
their needs. Nevertheless, it may present a disabled person with
unreasonable barriers and frustrations. Consequently, the application of a
reasonableness standard to assess the hostility or abusiveness of a
workplace environment becomes even more complex in ADA cases than
it is in Title VII cases. The reasonable woman standard in sex
discrimination cases is arguably inappropriate in that it assumes that
women and men view the world and its reasonableness in fundamentally
different ways, and that all members of each group think alike.
Consideration of disability as part of the reasonableness standard,
however, does not necessarily raise similar problems.
Underlying the equal opportunity model is the proposition that
disabled and nondisabled people do view the world and experience its
reasonableness in fundamentally different ways because the world is
tailored to suit the nondisabled. The inequity of this tailoring usually
eludes nondisabled people until disabled people call their attention to it.
Even then, nondisabled people may still feel that the status quo is
perfectly reasonable and that those who are different must simply adjust
or settle for being less than full participants in it?5 9 This theory thus
257. See LINDEMANN & GROSSMAN, supra note 171, at 1775-80 (discussing availability of back
pay); id. at 1821-22, 1828-33 (discussing availability of compensatory damages).
258. See id. at 1829 ("[M]ore specific proof of injury is needed when the actions causing the
injury are relatively mild.... [Wlhere the actions are egregious, less specific proof of effects may be
adequate."). See also United States v. Balistrieri, 981 F.2d 916, 932 (7th Cir. 1992) (addressing Fair
Housing Act claim) ("The more inherently degrading or humiliating the defendant's action is, the
more reasonable it is to infer that a person would suffer humiliation or distress from that action.").
259. Professor Adrienne Asch has described the wide perception gap between people with
disabilities and the nondisabled multitudes who surround them in the context of her own personal
interactions:
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appears to necessitate that some aspect of the disability experience be
incorporated into the reasonableness standard.
A "reasonable disabled person" standard, however, is very
problematic. The defining trait of disability is much more heterogeneous
than the defining trait of femaleness in sex-based harassment cases using
a reasonable woman standard. Despite the "discrete and insular" minority
group model explicitly referred to in the ADA's Findings,26 many
people with different disabilities may have little sense of a common
identity or frame of reference.2 1 Indeed, the geography of disability is
not so much "insular" as archipelagic.
One response to this situation could involve refining the standard even
further so that it would refer to the particular disability at issue in a given
case.262 However, any standard that asks a factfinder to put himself or
I was asked by an examining physician whether, because I was blind, I needed
her assistant to "come in and help you get dressed"; ... I was pushed to the
front of a line of customers at a bank, although blindness does not have any
relationship to the ability to stand and wait one's turn in a bank line; I was
spoken about rather than spoken to---"put her here" was said to a friend of
mine as we walked into a crowded room to join a meeting; a friend was
described by others not as my friend, but as my "assistant!' and my "guide"; a
friend of more than twenty years explained to me that my distress, irritation,
and frustration were unreasonable responses to people who were "trying to do
the right thing."
Asch, supra note 246, at 395-96 n.21.
260. See supra note 192 and accompanying text.
261. For example, people who describe themselves as being "Deaf' are members of a community
who communicate using American Sign Language and see themselves as belonging to a culture that
is separate and distinct from that of the hearing world. FRED PELKA, THE DISABILITY RIGHTS
MOVEMENT 88 (1997). People who are Deaf do not view deafness as an impairment, and they worry
that scientific developments such as cochlear implants could wipe out their culture. See Tucker,
supra note 26, at 385. A Deaf person who is otherwise healthy would probably find it very hard to
think of a hearing person who uses a wheelchair as a fellow member of a common minority group.
Even a Deaf person with epilepsy may have difficulty identifying with a hearing person with
epilepsy. Certainly, with respect to topics such as cochlear implants or the desire for deaf children,
Deaf people would find the views of many hearing people with other disabilities to be unreasonable,
and vice versa.
262. This standard in fact appeared in proposed GUIDELINES ON HARASSMENT BASED ON RACE,
COLOR, RELIGION, GENDER, NATIONAL ORIGIN, AGE OR DISABILITY ISSUED BY THE EEOC in 1993.
See Proposed 29 C.F.R. § 1609.1(c) (published at 58 FED. REG. 51,266 (1993)) (providing that the
"reasonable person" standard includes consideration of the "perspective of persons of the alleged
victim's race . . . or disability"). These Guidelines were never adopted, however, because they
received a great deal of criticism regarding violations of employers' First Amendment rights. Colker,
supra note 116, at 222. See also Easley v. West, 1994 WL 702904, *7 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 13, 1994)
(describing reasonableness element under Rehabilitation Act as requiring "objective detrimental
effect on reasonable person with same impairment').
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herself in the place of a person with a different life experience-be it
reasonable woman, reasonable person with a disability, reasonable
Korean-American, or reasonable Mormon-is on some level a fallacy.263
Our very ability to name such categories indicates that our culture has
constructed them and differentiated them from the generic "person." This
differentiation, and all the biases and stereotypes that go with it, will of
course affect the way in which someone assigned to a given category
negotiates the world and what he or she believes is reasonable. It is rather
unrealistic, then, to expect a judge or juror (let alone a conscientious
employer) who is not part of that same category to assess the
reasonableness of a situation from the "other's" perspective. This
problem becomes particularly acute in the ADA context where the
plaintiff has a mental disability, such as an anxiety disorder or mental
retardation.' 6
Nevertheless, recognition-so far as possible-of an individual's
disability experience should have some place in the legal standard, given
the "social construct" paradigm of disability. The best method to accord
that recognition is simply to ask the factfinder to determine whether the
harassment created an objectively hostile or abusive work environment
for the plaintiff, given the circumstance of the plaintiff's disability. Such
a standard does not ask the factfinder to perform the impossible task of
adopting the perspective of a reasonable quadriplegic person or a
reasonable mentally retarded person. Instead, it simply asks the
factfinder to take account of evidence regarding the plaintiffs disability
when assessing the reasonableness of the employer's conduct toward the
plaintiff.
The United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa
employed such a standard recently in Hiller v. Runyon.265 In its detailed
analysis of whether the harassment alleged in that case was objectively
abusive, the court clearly considered the circumstances of plaintiff Jeff
Hiller's disability experience, which included surgery for testicular
cancer.266 The court placed weight on the fact that the plaintiffs
263. "Different histories yield different judgments of working conditions." Bernstein, supra note
88, at 469. See also id. at 474 (explaining why male jurors cannot view events from the perspective
of a "reasonable woman").
264. See, e.g., Pirolli v. World Flavors, Inc., 1999 WL 1065214, *6 n.9 (E.D. Pa. 1999) ("If courts
were to modify the objective test to account for each particular mental disability suffered by every
plaintiff, the objective test could lose its objectivity.").
265. 95 F. Supp. 2d 1016, 1026 (S.D. Iowa 2000).
266. Id. at 1018.
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supervisor "berated, challenged and intimidated him on a daily basis"
immediately upon his return to work after radiation treatments, when the
plaintiff was still subject to medical restrictions.267 More significantly,
the court stated that "the language [the supervisor] used to harass Hiller,
including that Hiller was 'unproductive' and 'could not perform,' can...
have a particularly cruel and offensive double-meaning to an employee
who is infertile, unable to engage in sexual relations and recovering from
testicular cancer." 8 In this way, the court evaluated all of the
circumstances-including those of Hiller's disability-from its own
sense of reasonableness without trying to invent and assume the
perspective of some fictional "reasonable person with testicular cancer."
D. Harassment Based on Disability: If Disability Is a Social
Construct, When Does a Harasser Act "Because of" Disability?
The causation element of a hostile environment claim most clearly
illustrates the inadequacy of the copy-and-paste function with respect to
Title VII and the ADA. The question of whether harassment occurred
because of a disability is many times more layered than the Title VII
questions of whether harassment occurred because of an individual's
race, sex, national origin, or religion. The additional layers in the ADA
analysis stem from a number of factors regarding both the statute and the
nature of disability itself. First, the ADA, unlike Title VII, defines a
protected class, and the notion of disability in that definition is both
flexible and contingent. Second, disability-especially mental
disability-is much more likely than race, sex, national origin, or
religion to manifest itself in behavior that may strike co-workers and
supervisors as inappropriate or difficult. Third, the percentage of people
with disabilities in the workforce is quite low,269 and the number of
disabled employees in any given workplace is therefore likely to be very
small. Finally, popular confusion regarding reasonable accommodation
267. ld
268. IL Some evidence indicated that this choice of words was intentional; Hiller's supervisor
used these same expressions almost daily over the course of a year, even after Hiller had specifically
asked the supervisor to stop harassing him about his testicular cancer. kd at 1019. In addition, the
supervisor at another time stated that there were "too many cripples in our post office" and referred
to another employee who had undergone back surgery as a "cripple." Id at 1024.
269. See Susan Schwochau & Peter David Blanck, Economics of the Americans with Disabilities
Act, Part III: Does the ADA Disable the Disabled, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L 271,272 (2000)
(describing a 1998 survey, which revealed that only 26.6% of disabled individuals were employed,
compared to 78.4% of nondisabled individuals).
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rights may cause animosities resulting in harassment that appears,
superficially, to be unrelated to disability. These factors combine and
recombine to give rise to a number of new questions with respect to
causation, as explained below.
1. What degree of awareness must a harasser have with respect to the
disability of the harassed employee?
One of the earliest cases to discuss hostile environment actions under
the ADA stated that in order for harassment to be based on a disability,
the employer must first "have knowledge of the disability.""27 However,
given that the ADA defines "disability" flexibly and contingently in
terms of actual or past or even perceived substantially limiting
impairments, "knowledge of the disability" can mean many things:
knowledge of an employee's condition and its satisfaction of the ADA's
disability definition, knowledge of the employee's specific diagnosis,
knowledge only of the presence of an impairment, which happens to
fulfill the definition, or-given the "regarded as" prong of the
"disability" definition-mere mistaken beliefs as to any of the above.
The Seventh Circuit, in Casper v. Gunite Corp.,271 in an unpublished
opinion, offered some clarification of the knowledge element in stating
that "'some symptoms are so obviously manifestations of an underlying
disability that it would be reasonable to infer that an employer actually
knew of the disability." 272 The plaintiff in that case, Ricky Casper, had
an I.Q. of sixty-six and had been diagnosed as "mildly mentally
handicapped., 273 Although he had mentioned to Gunite's personnel
director during his job interview that he was "slow" and had been in
special education programs, neither Casper nor the personnel director
communicated this information to anyone else at Gunite.274 Once Casper
began working, his supervisors began peppering him with offensive
comments, including epithets such as "Ricky Retardo" and "dumb
270. Haysman v. Food Lion, Inc., 893 F. Supp. 1092, 1109 n.3 (S.D. Ga. 1995) (citing Hedberg v.
Ind. Bell Tel. Co., 47 F.3d 928 (7th Cir. 1995)).
271. No. 99 3215, 2000 WL 975168 (7th Cir. July 11, 2000).
272. Id. at *3 (quoting Hedberg v. Ind. Bell Tel. Co., 47 F.3d 928, 934 (7th Cir. 1995)).
273. ld. at *1.
274. Id. at *3. Even if this information had been communicated to others, the Seventh Circuit held
that it was "not sufficient to put Gunite on notice that [the plaintiff] was disabled." Id.
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ass." '275 Another supervisor allegedly told him that his children would
"grow up acting like [Casper], like slow and stuff. 276
The Seventh Circuit, in analyzing the causation element of Casper's
ADA harassment claim, held that the case presented "a genuine issue of
material fact over whether Casper's actions and outward appearance
reasonably put Gunite on notice that he was mentally disabled."2' In so
holding, the court emphasized "the fact that some of the comments made
by Gunite employees suggest that they viewed Casper as having a
learning disability."'278
The Seventh Circuit's opinion suggests, reasonably, that the
harasser-in this case Gunite through its supervisors-need not be aware
of the details of a disabled employee's specific diagnosis. 9 However, it
does suggest that the harasser must have notice that the employee in
question has a disability. The opinion is unclear as to whether the court
refers to disability in the general sense of impairment or in the ADA's
legal sense of an impairment that "substantially limits" a major life
activity.2'0
Given the rather Talmudic complexity of ADA's disability
definition,"1 it seems extremely arbitrary to focus the causation inquiry
275. Id. at *2.
276. Id. at *2 n.2.
277. Il at *3.
278. Id.
279. Given principles of confidentiality in the medical profession and the confidentiality
provisions of the ADA itself, see 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d) (1994), the details of an employee's
diagnosis would not likely reach many potential harassers at the employee's workplace, if it reached
any of them at all. Another issue related to diagnoses concerns whether an employee's impairment
must in fact have been diagnosed in relation to some particular disease before it can become the type
of disability upon which actionable harassment can be based. Two district courts have indicated that
such may be the case. See Presta v. S.E. Pa. Transp. Auth., No. CIV.A. 97CIV.2338, 1998 WL
310735, *13 n.9 (E.D. Pa. June 11, 1998) ("Presta cannot argue that the harassment was 'based
upon' his adjustment and anxiety disorders, as he was harassed for two to three years before he was
even diagnosed with these disorders."); Mears v. Gulfstreamn Aerospace Corp., 905 F. Supp. 1075,
1081 (S.D. Ga. 1995) (holding that plaintiff could not show "that any discrimination or harassment
was causally connected to her disability" where "her agoraphobia and dythmia had not yet been
diagnosed" when she left her job). Given that an impairment-even one technically qualifying as a
disability under the ADA-must exist before it is diagnosed, and given that supervisors and co-
workers will not ordinarily learn whether and how an employee's impairment has been diagnosed,
these holdings are problematic.
280. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(a) (1994).
281. The EEOC, for example, in its INTERPREnvE GuIDANCE To TTLE I OF THE ADA, spends 30
paragraphs attempting to elucidate the statutory "disability" definition and its component parts. See
29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(g)-(I) (2000). The last two cases presenting definitional issues presented to
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on whether the harasser understood the employee's impairment in terms
of that definition and all of its legalistic detail. After all, the definition's
"substantially limits" terminology alone may call for consideration of
factors such as "the permanent or long term impact, or the expected
permanent or long term impact of, or resulting from, the impairment,"
"[t]he geographical area to which the individual has reasonable access,"
and "[t]he job from which the individual has been disqualified because of
an impairment, and the number and types of jobs utilizing similar
training, knowledge, skills or abilities, within that geographical area,
from which the individual is also disqualified because of the
impairment." ' 2 It is hard to imagine a defendant-harasser saying
anything other than "I never gave those kinds of things any thought"
when asked about these factors, even if he or she genuinely believed that
the harassed employee had some kind of impairment, and even if a court
might later classify that impairment as a disability under the ADA.
In the end, the analysis of causation becomes much more
appropriately focused if framed in terms of whether the actor harassed
the employee either because the employee had an impairment or because
the actor believed that the employee had an impairment. This framework
still requires the employee to carry the burden of persuasion in
establishing a causal connection between the real or perceived
impairment and the harassment, yet it avoids tangential questions that
have little or nothing to do with the nature of disability-based
discrimination.
the Supreme Court resulted in nine separate opinions, see Sutton v. United Air Lines, 527 U.S. 471,
474 (1999) (O'Connor, J.); id. at 494 (Ginsburg, J., concurring); id. at 495 (Stevens, J., dissenting);
id. at 513 (Breyer, J., dissenting); Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (1998) (Kennedy, J.); id. at 655
(Stevens, J., concurring); id. at 656 (Ginsburg, J. concurring); id. at 657 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring
in the judgment in part and dissenting in part); id. at 664 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment
in part and dissenting in part), a few of which had the justices philosophizing about the significance
of reproduction as a human activity, see id. at 639 (Kennedy, J.) ("[R]eproduction could not be
regarded as any less important than working or learning."); id. at 664-65 (O'Connor, J., concurring
in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) ("[The act of giving birth to a child, while a very
important part of the lives of many women, is not generally the same as.. . caring for one's self,
performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning and working.")
(internal quotes omitted).
282. See 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.20).
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2. When does a harasser act because of an employee's disability
rather than because of the employee's conduct?
Even in cases where the harasser is aware of an employee's disability,
the harassed employee must still prove that the harassment stemmed
from his or her disability and not from some other cause. Because
disability can sometimes manifest itself through conduct, courts may find
it necessary to determine whether harassment based on an employee's
disability-related conduct was in fact based on the employee's disability.
Employers have sometimes defended against disability-based hostile
environment actions by arguing that the alleged harassment arose from
conduct on the part of both the disabled employee and the harasser that
led to a personality conflict between them.
For example, in Hendler v. Intelecom USA,"83 the defendant asserted
that even if Stephen Hendler's supervisor and co-workers harassed him,
their harassment stemmed from Hendler's status as a non-smoker and his
requests that they not smoke in the office, rather than from Hendler's
asthma. 4 This defense tactic is reminiscent of one used by employers in
early sexual harassment cases; defendants would argue-and courts
would sometimes hold-that the harasser's conduct occurred not because
of the victim's gender but instead because the victim was sexually
attractive to the harasser.285 Such an argument portrays harassment as a
personal issue between two particular individuals rather than as an
instance of socially harmful discrimination. In the ADA context, this
personalization of harassment coincides with the medical model of
disability, which posits that disability is a personal issue rather than a
societal one. 6 Under this model, unlawful discrimination can appear to
be nothing more than a non-actionable personality conflict.' Indeed, the
persistence of the medical model in contemporary thought probably
283. 963 F. Supp. 200 (E.D.N.Y. 1997).
284. Id. at 209.
285. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
286. See supra notes 133-38 and accompanying text.
287. See, e.g., Walton v. Mental Health Ass'n of S.E. Pa., 168 F.3d 661, 667 (3d Cir. 1999)
("Although it is clear that the relationship between [the plaintiff] and [her supervisor] was poor, [the
plaintiff] has not asserted facts that would allow a reasonable jury to find that [the supervisor]
harassed her because of her disability."). The Walton court cited an ADA case outside of the
harassment context for the proposition that "[a] personality conflict doesn't ripen into an ADA claim
simply because one of the parties has a disability." Id (citing Uhl v. Zalk Josephs Fabricators, Inc.,
121 F.3d 1133, 1137 (7th Cir. 1997)).
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accounts for the fact that "many judges are not strongly imbued with the
notion that basic civil rights are at stake in ADA cases." 8
Fortunately, a number of lower courts have begun to recognize the
connection between disability and the types of conflicts that can lead to
harassment. The Hendler court, for example, held that the taunting in that
case could have arisen not from Hendler's persistent requests that his
colleagues and supervisor refrain from smoking, but instead from
the fact that [Hendler] had difficulty breathing. For example, an
employee confined to a wheelchair who is chided about not being
able to climb the stairs is being harassed on the basis of his
disability regardless of the fact that the comments are directed at
the environment or his ability to function under the working
atmosphere.289
Such careful consideration of the causation element is even more
critical in ADA cases than in Title VII cases. The very small number of
people with disabilities employed at a given workplace2 ° tends to focus
attention on the harassed employee as an individual with unique quirks
and proclivities rather than as a member of a larger protected class. Proof
of causation is rather easy in cases such as Fox v. General Motors
Corp. ,291 recently decided by the Fourth Circuit, where the harassers use
abusive language that specifically refers to an employee's disability.292
However, in cases not involving such blatant references, proving
causation normally involves comparing the defendant's treatment of the
disabled plaintiff to its treatment of other disabled employees. 293 This
288. See Diller, supra note 26, at 46.
289. 963 F. Supp. at 209.
290. See supra note 269 and accompanying text.
291. 247 F.3d 169 (4th Cir. 2001).
292. The harassers in Fox called the plaintiff and other disabled workers "handicapped MFs,"
among other epithets. Id. at 174.
293. Clark Freshman, Whatever Happened to Anti-Semitism? How Social Science Theories
Identify Discrimination and Promote Coalitions Between "Different" Minorities, 85 CORNELL L.
REV. 313, 338-39 (2000). Differences in treatment received by a disabled employee and by his or
her nondisabled colleagues may aid in a showing of causation, but are far from probative. See Bryant
v. Compass Bank, No. CV-95-N-2458-S, 1996 WL 529214, *6 (N.D. Ala. May 31, 1996)
(explaining that if "other workers openly violated the dress code and [the defendant] singled out only
the plaintiff, one could reasonably infer that some type of discrimination might be a factor")
(emphasis added). Of course, if the defendant can show that nondisabled employees received the
very treatment of which the plaintiff complains, a court will hold that the treatment was not based
upon disability. See, e.g., Mannell v. Am. Tobacco Co., 871 F. Supp. 854, 860 n.5 (E.D. Va. 1994)
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avenue of proof is not as available to ADA plaintiffs as it is to Title VII
plaintiffs because a workplace is less likely to include many individuals
with disabilities, although it may include many employees of different
races and sexes. Even when an ADA plaintiff has several disabled co-
workers, the possible variety of their disabilities may weaken the
probative value of comparisons. Without helpful comparative evidence, a
court or jury is likely to focus on the plaintiffs own personality and
conduct, rather than his or her disability, as the root of the harassment
problem.294
Other "conduct versus disability" issues arise when a disability leads
to behavior that might render an employee unable to perform his or her
particular job, as in cases where an employee's disability causes
absenteeism or lateness. While an employer may certainly rely on
"consequences or symptoms of a disability" to conclude that an
individual is not qualified for a given job, those consequences or
symptoms "are no justification for harassment."295 Therefore, an
employer may enforce an attendance policy, but it cannot do so in a
manner that singles out disabled employees and places harassing burdens
upon them.
For example, in Fritz v. Mascotech Automotive Services,296 plaintiff
Jeffrey Fritz alleged that his frequent lateness to work was attributable to
his diabetes because his fluctuating work schedule altered his insulin
requirements and caused him to awaken frequently with hypoglycemia
and occasionally with insulin shock.' On such days, Fritz alleged, he
could not drive to work until the condition had passed.298
When Fritz's supervisor told him that his lateness and absences were
becoming a problem, Fritz explained their cause2 99 and suggested that he
be allowed to work late on the days when he arrived late, to make up for
lost time."'0 The supervisor did not implement this suggestion, although
(explaining in dicta that allegedly harassing conduct could not have been based on disability because
nondisabled employees were subject to identical conduct).
294. See Freshman, supra note 293, at 326 ("In an organization with [ very few people like the
plaintiff, it would be easy to assume that the plaintiffs peculiarities, rather than impermissible
discrimination, really explain her misfortune.").
295. Haysman v. Food Lion, Inc., 893 F. Supp. 1092, 1109 (S.D. Ga. 1995).
296. 914 F. Supp. 1481 (E.D. Mich. 1996).
297. Id. at 1484.
298. Id
299. Id
300. Id. at 1490.
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he did indicate that he would excuse diabetes-related absences and
lateness under an individualized probationary policy that he imposed
upon Fritz.30' The policy included a number of requirements that did not
apply to other workers. For example, it required Fritz to punch a time
clock, to document all incidents of absence and lateness with doctor's
notes, and to perform work that was considered "less demanding" and
"boring., 302
After Fritz filed an ADA hostile environment claim, his employer
moved for summary judgment, arguing that the requirements of the
probationary policy were imposed upon Fritz because of his conduct and
not because of his disability.3 Nevertheless, the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Michigan denied summary judgment to
the employer, noting that Fritz's supervisor, in requiring the doctor's
notes, had used nothing but "personal judgment" in assuming that the
attendance problems were "more likely attributable to delinquency than
disability. 30 4 The court explained that a jury could have inferred from
the evidence that the supervisor "took an especially dim view" of Fritz's
attendance problems because of a "suspicion that [Fritz] was 'misusing'
his disability as an excuse. ''305
As a result, the court identified a genuine issue of material fact as to
whether the supervisor's response to Fritz's problems "was improperly
influenced to some degree by consideration of the disability. '30 6 The
court also noted, however, that to prevail at trial, Fritz would have to
show that his latenesses were in fact caused by his diabetes and also that,
if his employer were to provide specific reasonable accommodations, his
diabetes and his consequent late arrivals would not render him
301. Id.
302. Id. at 1485. The requirement of a doctor's note for each incident aggravated Fritz's lateness
problem because Fritz would have to spend additional time visiting his doctor's office before
arriving at work. Id. In addition, Fritz protested that the requirement was nonsensical because by the
time he was able to drive to see his doctor, his hypoglycemia and shock would already have passed.
Id.
303. Id. at 1495.
304. Id. at 1494.
299. Id. at 1495.
306. Id. Cf Schwertfager v. City of Boynton Beach, 42 F. Supp. 2d 1347, 1367 (S.D. Fla. 1999)
(holding that employee who received harsh criticism of her work after returning from breast cancer
surgery had produced no evidence to show criticism was based on disability rather than on work
product, and noting that decisions "based on reasons independent of an employee's disability, while
they may correlate with a disability, are not actionable under the ADA").
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unqualified for the job."7 Such requirements make perfect sense, because
if reasonable accommodations could render an employee qualified to
perform a given job, then the employer "must attempt to accommodate
the individual's disability, not harass him because of it."3 8
In requiring Fritz to punch a time clock and to provide doctor's notes,
Fritz's supervisor appears to have acted on a stereotypical assumption
that disabled people are lazy and will lie to avoid having to work. This
scenario is not unusual, and a few courts have correctly focused on
stereotypes in assessing the causation of hostile environment harassment.
In one case where an employer claimed that an employee had received
harsh treatment because he "constantly complained, rarely worked his
scheduled hours, overstated his physical complaints, and wanted to avoid
work," the United States District Court for the Southern District of
Georgia held that a jury could infer from the employee's medical
evidence that his complaints were not overstated and that "his absences
were the legitimate result of severe pain."3 9 Because a jury could further
infer that the defendant "engaged in negative stereotyping of the disabled
as people who overstate complaints, do not want to work, and 'milk' or
'snowball' their employers for benefits," the court correctly held that a
summary judgment for the defendant was inappropriate on the issue of
whether the harsh treatment had been based on a disability.10
As the above cases illustrate, disability and conduct are often
intertwined. While a harassing employer may appear superficially to be
reacting to an employee's conduct, the employer may in fact be reacting
to the employee's disability. The relation between an employee's
disability and his conduct is complex and individualized, but a factfimder
cannot determine whether harassment was based on disability without
some understanding of this relation. For this reason, courts should avoid
summary disposals of the causation issue in ADA harassment cases when
the conduct of which the employer complains may have stemmed from
the employee's disability.
307. Fritz, 914 F. Supp. at 1495.
308. Haysman v. Food Lion, Inc., 893 F. Supp. 1092, 1109 (S.D. Ga. 1995).
309. ld at 1108-09.
310. Id. at 1109. See also Simonetti v. Runyon, No. Civ.A. 98-2128, 2000 WL 1133066, *8
(D.NJ. Aug. 7, 2000) (holding that, under Rehabilitation Act, epithets including "disability chaser'
and 'Taker' contributed to creation of fact issue as to whether defendant's harassment was based
upon employee's disability).
Washington Law Review
3. How does reasonable accommodation relate to disability as a basis
of harassment?
An employer's failure to provide reasonable accommodation to a
disabled employee, when combined with other harassing conduct, may
create a hostile or abusive working environment. 31 However, an
employer's appropriate provision of such accommodation may inspire
co-worker backlash, which can also create a hostile or abusive
environment for the employee with a disability. This backlash stems
from common misunderstandings of the ADA's equal opportunity model
as one that accords special rights rather than equal rights.312 A "biased
prototype 313 of people with disabilities as selfish and willing to do
anything to gain the special benefits to which they believe themselves
entitled may also contribute to co-worker resentment and harassment.31 4
For example, in Hudson v. Loretex Corp.,315 plaintiff Robert Hudson
experienced an epileptic seizure while at home, and his physician
attributed the episode to the fact that Hudson had been working night
shifts.316  On the recommendation of the physician, Loretex
accommodated Hudson by moving him to the day shift. Once Hudson
received this accommodation, his supervisor informed him, in front of
co-workers, that he should be "more grateful," given that the company
had changed his shift because he was "supposedly sick," and that the
change had "affected many people." 318 Hudson's co-workers later
accused him of receiving preferential treatment because of a "phoney
illness," 319 and his supervisor, in later reprimanding Hudson regarding an
unrelated incident, implied again that Hudson was lying about his
epilepsy. 320 The United States District Court for the Northern District of
New York correctly denied Loretex's motion to dismiss Hudson's hostile
311. See supra notes 255-56 and accompanying text.
312. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
313. Professor Martha Charnallas uses this term to describe "stock images, mental portraits,
schemas, or cultural scripts... that operate to limit the law's protection of marginal social groups."
See Chamallas, supra note 38, at 778.
314. See Davis, supra note 244 at 197-98.
315. No. 95-CV-844 (RSPIRWS), 1997 WL 159282, *1 (N.D.N.Y. April 2, 1997).
316. Id. at *1.
317. Id.
318. Id.
319. Id. at *3.
320. Id. at *1.
632
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environment action, holding that Hudson's allegations described a
"pattern of harassment" based on disability that could support such a
claim. 3
21
A few courts have stated more expressly that harassment based on a
request for accommodation is equivalent to harassment based on
disability, for purposes of hostile environment actions under the ADA.3"
This interpretation makes eminent sense in light of the ADA's equal
opportunity model. Without necessary reasonable accommodations,
many people with disabilities would be deprived at the outset of
opportunities to perform at the workplace. Therefore, one who harasses a
disabled employee for requesting accommodation is essentially harassing
that employee for being disabled and daring to work.
Harassment that goes so far as to interfere with an employee's request
for or use of an accommodation implicates the ADA's coercion
provision." This provision, in part, makes it "unlawful to coerce,
intimidate, threaten, or interfere with any individual in the exercise or
enjoyment of . . . any right granted or protected by this chapter."'324
Requesting reasonable accommodations and using such accommodations
are both rights "granted or protected" by the ADA.3" Therefore, under
the coercion provision, any interference with these actions is unlawful.
No corresponding provision appears in Title VII, whose formal equality
model does not grant or protect affirmative rights such as the right to
accommodation.
The coercion provision differs from the ADA's retaliation provision,
which, like Title VII's retaliation provision,3 26 prohibits employers from
discriminating against people who participate in investigations or
hearings regarding discriminatory employment practices or who
321. Id. at *3.
322. See, e.g., Walton v. Mental Health Assoc., 168 F.3d 661, 667 (3d Cir. 1999) (stating that an
ADA hostile environment plaintiff must prove, among other things, that "the harassment was based
on her disability or a request for an accommodation"); Simonetti v Runyon, No. Civ.A. 98-2128,
2000 WL 1133066, -7 (D.N.J. Aug. 7,2000) (same).
323. 42 U.S.C. § 12203(b) (1994).
324. Id.
325. See supra notes 154-78 and accompanying text (discussing reasonable accommodation
provision). See also Wray v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 10 F. Supp. 2d 1036, 1040 (E.D. Wis.
1998) (implying that the use of a reasonable accommodation is a right protected by 42 U.S.C.
§ 12203(b)).
326. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1994).
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otherwise oppose those practices. 27 To state a claim under the ADA's
retaliation provision, a plaintiff must prove that the defendant has
"discriminate[d]" in response to the plaintiff's protected activities.328
Therefore, retaliation in the form of harassment will not be actionable
unless it rises to the level of discrimination by being severe and
pervasive.329  In contrast, under the ADA's coercion provision,
harassment is actionable even if it falls short of being severe and
pervasive, provided it takes the form of coercion, intimidation, threat, or
interference, and provided it is based upon a disabled employee's
requests for or enjoyment of accommodations.330
Most litigants and courts thus far have looked only to the ADA's
narrower retaliation provision when asserting and analyzing claims based
on interference with accommodations. 331 This phenomenon most likely
results from habits developed with respect to Title VII, which lacks a
coercion provision, as explained above. Further, even when courts have
looked to the coercion provision, they have failed to appreciate the
difference between it and the retaliation provision. 33' As a result, valid
coercion claims have been dismissed for failure to meet the higher
retaliation standard.
327. Id. § 12203(a).
328. Id.
329. Hostile environment harassment is actionable under the ADA only because it represents
discrimination regarding "terms, conditions, and privileges of employment," which is prohibited by
42 U.S.C. § 12112(a).
330. The coercion provision specifically prohibits coercion, intimidation, threats, and interference
directed at disabled employees pursuing or enjoying their ADA rights. 42 U.S.C. § 12203. This
provision is separate and distinct from the ADA's prohibition of discrimination with respect to
"terms, conditions, and privileges of employment," which gives rise to hostile environment actions,
see id. § 12112(a). Therefore, the ADA does not support the imposition of hostile environment
standards on the analysis of a coercion claim.
331. See Wray v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 10 F. Supp. 2d 1036, 1040 (E.D. Wis. 1998)
(stating that "[m]ost of the cases interpreting § 12203 are 'retaliation' cases arising in an
employment context").
332. See, e.g., Barnett v. U.S. Air, 228 F.3d 1105, 1121 (9th Cir. 2000), and cases cited therein. In
Barnett, the Ninth Circuit, after citing the ADA's coercion provision (and not its retaliation
provision), noted that "it is necessary to establish a framework for analyzing retaliation claims under
the ADA. Most other circuits have adopted the Title VII framework for analyzing ADA retaliation
claims." Id. The court then explained that "[a]dopting the Title VII framework incorporates a
comprehensive body of law analyzing workplace retaliation. This seems useful." Id. Unfortunately,
Title VII's "comprehensive body of law" says absolutely nothing about the coercion claim that the
court was analyzing because Title VII has no coercion provision. Thus, while Title VII retaliation
doctrine may have seemed "useful" to a court oblivious to the difference between ADA retaliation
and coercion claims, that doctrine was in fact inapposite.
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For example, in Silk v. City of Chicago,333 a case alleging harassment
based on the plaintiff's receipt of an accommodation, the Seventh Circuit
expressly cited both the coercion provision and the retaliation provision
of the ADA.334 However, after summarizing these two provisions, the
court referred to the claim as one for "retaliation" and went on to analyze
the harassment only in terms of the retaliation provision and its
"discrimination" standard.33 '5 This standard of course led the court to the
"severe and pervasive" requirement for discriminatory harassment,336 and
in turn led to an affirmation of summary judgment for the defendant on
the retaliation claim. 337 Thus, the Seventh Circuit assigned absolutely no
independent significance to the ADA's coercion provision. Most likely,
the court's failure to understand this provision-and perhaps the entire
equal opportunity model-is traceable to the Title VII "prototype" that
the court admitted to following.
338
In sum, Title VII and the ADA differ starkly with respect to the scope
of employees they cover and remedial mechanisms they provide. The
ADA's attempt to define a specific protected class in terms of disability,
its provision of a right to reasonable accommodation, and its inclusion of
mechanisms to protect that right raise new questions regarding the causal
relation between protected characteristics and harassment. The three
questions discussed above are unique to the context of disability
discrimination, and courts therefore cannot look to Title VII
jurisprudence expecting to find answers to them. Instead, courts must
approach the causation questions with an appreciation for the unique
theoretical underpinnings of the ADA, as explained above.
E. Employer Responsibility for Hostile Environment Harassment:
Given the Complex Definition of Disability, How Can an Employer
Prohibit Disability Discrimination and Recognize It When It
Occurs?
Even when a hostile environment plaintiff can prove that he or she
experienced severe and pervasive harassment because of a protected
333. 194 F.3d 788 (7th Cir. 1999).
334. Id. at 799.
335. Id.
336. Id. at 807.
337. Id at 808.
338. Id.
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characteristic, the plaintiff must still show that the employer was, at least
vicariously, responsible for the harassment.339 With respect to harassment
by a co-worker, an employer is liable if it knew or should have known
about the harassment but negligently failed to take prompt remedial
action.340 With respect to harassment by a supervisor, the Supreme Court
in Burlington Industries. v. Ellerth,34' a Title VII sex discrimination
case, recently clarified the standard for employer responsibility.
Under Ellerth, an employer is vicariously liable for a hostile
environment created by a supervisor with immediate or successively
higher authority over the harassed employee.342 However, an employer
may raise in its defense that it took reasonable care to prevent and
promptly correct the harassment and that the employee unreasonably
failed to take advantage of opportunities to prevent or correct the
harassment.343 With respect to the first part of this defense, a small
employer may show that it reasonably resorted to informal means to
prevent and correct harassment, but a larger employer will normally need
to show that it communicated to all of its employees a formal anti-
harassment policy, including a complaint procedure that allowed a
complainant to bypass harassing supervisors.3 4 Once a policy is in place,
a showing that an employee unreasonably failed to use such a complaint
procedure will normally satisfy the second part of the defense. 345
Although they evolved in the context of Title VII, the above rules
regarding employer responsibility for co-worker and supervisor
harassment apply to ADA hostile environment cases.346 While these rules
339. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
340. See, e.g., Baskerville v. Culligan Int'l Co., 50 F.3d 428, 431-32 (7th Cir. 1995). See also
LINDEMANN & KADUE, supra note 103, at 18 (describing liability standard in co-worker harassment
cases).
341. 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
342. Id. at 765. See also Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998) (decided on
same day as Ellerth and articulating same standard for employer liability).
343. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807.
344. Farragher, 524 U.S. at 807-09. See also LINDEMANN & GROSSMAN, supra note 171, at 522
(3d ed. Cum. Supp. 2000) (explaining that an employer will normally be held to have taken
reasonable care to prevent harassment when it has put all employees on notice of a policy governing
the reporting and investigation of harassing conduct).
345. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; Farragher, 524 U.S. at 807-08.
346. See, e.g., Silk v. City of Chicago, 194 F.3d 788, 807 n.18 (7th Cir. 1999) (reciting standards
for supervisor and co-worker harassment); Davis-Durnil v. Viii. of Carpentersville, 128 F. Supp. 2d
575, 585 (N.D I1. 2001) (same); Simonetti v. Runyon, Civ. A. 98-2128, 2000 WL 1133066, *7
(D.N.J. Aug. 7, 2000) (reciting standard for co-worker harassment); Hiller v. Runyon, 95 F. Supp. 2d
1016, 1023-24 (S.D. Iowa 2000) (reciting standard for supervisor harassment).
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are fairly straightforward in the Title VII context, they become more
complex when applied to disability harassment under the ADA because
of that statute's complex definition of "disability."347 For example, an
employer's typical anti-harassment policy that is consistent with Title
VII will prohibit discrimination based on race, sex, national origin, and
religion, and most employees will have some notion of whether they are
acting in response to such characteristics when they interact with co-
workers and subordinates. In contrast, under the ADA, it is easy for an
employer to establish a policy prohibiting employees from harassing any
disabled subordinates or co-workers because of their disabilities, but it is
extremely difficult for the policy to explain-and for employees to
understand-how to determine if a worker is in fact disabled under the
statute's complex, three-pronged test.348
A related problem inheres in the employer's duty under the ADA to
take prompt action to correct co-worker harassment. An employer can be
liable for failing to act if it knows or should know that such harassment is
taking place,349 but the law is unclear as to whether the employer should
know that the harassment involves a statutorily-defined disability before
the duty to act will arise. No ADA case has specifically addressed this
issue, but a Rehabilitation Act50 case has indicated that an employer
must take remedial action when it is "aware" of a co-worker's
"discriminatory acts."" Presumably, harassment is not discriminatory
under the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act unless it is based on a
disability, so awareness of discriminatory acts would necessitate
awareness of a disability. As a practical matter, however, it makes little
sense to condition an employer's duty to remedy harassment upon the
employer's familiarity with the complex disability definition. A sounder
policy would encourage an employer to investigate and remedy instances
of harassment whenever they appear to be based on an employee's
physical or mental impairment, whether or not those impairments may
meet the technical requirements of a statutorily-defined disability.
347. See supra notes 179-81 and accompanying text.
348. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2).
349. See supra note 340 and accompanying text.
350. Because the ADA is based in large part on Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29
U.S.C. §794(a) (1994), cases decided under the Rehabilitation Act are instructive to courts
interpreting the ADA. For a discussion of the relationship of these two statutes, see supra notes 154-
67 and accompanying text.
351. Simonetti v. Runyon, Civ. A. 98-2128, 2000 WL 1133066, *9 (D.N.J. Aug. 7,2000).
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Fortunately, with respect to employer responsibility, erring on the side
of caution is consistent with sound management practices. A
employment policy that prohibits employees from harassing each other
because of physical or mental impairments has the virtue of being fairly
easy to understand; in addition, it can both assist an employer in avoiding
potential ADA liability and in fostering a work environment in which
people focus on productivity rather than intra-office conflicts. Further, if
a possibly disabled employee reports an incident of harassment that
sounds more than trivial, an employer would be wise to investigate it and
take any necessary action. Even if the conduct is based on something
short of a disability, it is still likely to be interfering with productivity by
distracting workers and hindering teamwork.
IV. CONCLUSION
Lawyers and judges are trained to think in terms of analogies, and it is
tempting to draw extensive analogies between hostile environment
claims arising from almost identical language in Title VII and the ADA.
Indeed, as the Ninth Circuit has noted, it seems useful to import existing
Title VII doctrine into ADA hostile environment opinions; the copy and
paste icons loom large in such cases. Nevertheless, what seems useful is
not always what serves justice under the ADA, a statute that supplements
Title VI's theory of formal equality with an equal opportunity theory of
its own. Lawyers and judges therefore must understand the ADA's own
notions of equality and discrimination, and incorporate these notions into
their thinking as they begin to analyze the many ADA hostile
environment issues that are likely to arise in the near future.
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